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Tax Policy and Global Warming
David G. Duff*

PRÉCIS

Le 17 décembre 2002, le gouvernement du Canada a annoncé sa ratification du Protocole
de Kyoto à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques. En
vertu du protocole, le Canada a accepté de ramener ses émissions annuelles de gaz à
effet de serre (GES) à 6 % en deçà des niveaux de 1990 pour la période 2008-2012 — un
engagement qui exige une réduction de 30 % par rapport aux émissions de GES projetées
pour 2010, si rien ne change. Pour atteindre cet objectif, le gouvernement canadien a
établi des cibles de réduction précises et proposé divers moyens dans le cadre de son
Plan d’action sur le changement climatique (PACC), rendu public en novembre 2002.
Bien que les principaux moyens d’action prévus dans le plan requièrent l’engagement
de dépenses publiques, la conclusion d’ententes volontaires et la mise en place d’un
programme d’information publique, il y est également fait mention de l’adoption de
mesures fiscales — bien qu’elles ne soient pas clairement précisées.
Le présent article se veut une contribution au PACC puisqu’on y examine le rôle que
la politique fiscale peut jouer pour aider le Canada à respecter ses engagements en
vertu de l’accord de Kyoto. La partie II contient une justification générale des taxes
écologiques et des encouragements fiscaux pour répondre aux défis environnementaux
et examine les différents motifs qui justifient ces mesures fiscales ainsi que leur
incidence sur la conception de ces taxes et encouragements fiscaux. La partie III passe
en revue les mesures fiscales actuelles et potentielles au Canada et dans d’autres pays
développés qui sont axées sur le problème du réchauffement de la planète, à la lumière
de leur efficacité probable dans la réduction des émissions de GES ou l’augmentation des
puits de carbone qui éliminent les émissions de GES de l’atmosphère terrestre. La
partie IV revient sur le CAPP et montre comment l’apport des mesures fiscales peut se
concrétiser dans chacun des domaines où des moyens d’action sont proposés dans le
cadre du Plan d’action sur le changement climatique du gouvernement canadien : (1)
transport; (2) habitations et bâtiments commerciaux/institutionnels; (3) grands
émetteurs industriels (incluant énergie renouvelable et combustibles fossiles plus
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propres); (4) PME et émissions fugitives; (5) agriculture, foresterie et enfouissement; et
(6) réductions des émissions internationales. La partie V contient des conclusions
générales sur le rôle que peut jouer la politique fiscale dans la lutte contre le
réchauffement de la planète.
ABSTRACT

The Canadian government announced its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on December 17, 2002. Under this
protocol, Canada has agreed to reduce annual emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
to 6 percent below 1990 levels during the period 2008-2012—a commitment that
requires a 30 percent reduction relative to projected GHG emissions for 2010 assuming
business as usual. In order to achieve this objective, the Canadian government has
established specific reduction targets and proposed various policy instruments in its
climate change action plan (CCAP) released in November 2002. Although the main
policy instruments contemplated in the plan involve public spending, voluntary
agreements, and public information programs, it also mentions tax measures—though
these are not clearly spelled out.
This article seeks to contribute to the CCAP by considering the role that tax policy
can play in helping to meet Canada’s commitments under the Kyoto accord. The author
first provides a general justification for environmental taxes and tax incentives to
address environmental challenges, examining different rationales for these tax measures
and their implications for the design of environmental taxes and tax incentives. He then
reviews existing and potential tax measures in Canada and other developed countries
that are directed at the problem of global warming, considering their likely effectiveness
to reduce GHG emissions or enhance carbon sinks that remove GHGs from the earth’s
atmosphere. Returning to the CCAP, the author suggests ways in which tax measures
can contribute to each of the areas for which action is proposed under the plan: (1)
transportation; (2) housing and commercial/institutional buildings; (3) large industrial
emitters (including renewable energy and cleaner fossil fuels); (4) small and mediumsized enterprises and fugitive emissions; (5) agriculture, forestry, and landfills; and (6)
international emission reductions. Finally, he offers general conclusions on the role of
tax policy in reducing global warming.
KEYWORDS: ENVIRONMENT ■ GASOLINE TAXES ■ FUELS ■ MOTOR VEHICLES ■ TAX INCENTIVES ■
TAX EXPENDITURES
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INTRODUCTION
The government of Canada announced its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on December 17,
2002.1 Designed to stabilize and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)2 that
are predicted to increase the earth’s surface temperature, affecting natural ecosystems and human health, the Kyoto protocol establishes specific limitations on each
party’s annual carbon dioxide (CO2 ) equivalent emissions during the period 2008 to
2012 relative to its emissions in 1990. According to article 3 of the protocol, these
limitations may be satisfied by both reductions in GHG emissions and the enhancement of “sinks” that remove GHGs from the atmosphere.3 Article 6 allows parties
to meet their commitments by acquiring “emission reduction units” from other
parties, while article 17 establishes an international trading system for GHG emissions. Commitments may also be satisfied through joint implementation involving
investments in emission reductions or sinks in other industrialized countries,4 and

1 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997)
(herein referred to as “the Kyoto protocol” or “the Kyoto accord”) and United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/index.html.
For a useful review of the process and structure of the Kyoto protocol, see Jutta Brunnée, “The
Kyoto Protocol: Testing Ground for Compliance Theories?” (2003) vol. 63, no. 2 Zeitschrift für
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völerrecht (Heidelberg Journal of International Law) 255-80.
2 Article 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change defines “greenhouse
gases” as “those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that
absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.” GHGs occur both naturally and as a result of human
activities, and include water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Although
different gases have different effects on global warming, it is customary to standardize these
emissions to CO2 equivalents when measuring their effects on global warming.
3 Article 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change defines a “sink” as
“any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor
of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.” Trees, plants, and soils act as carbon sinks since trees
and plants absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through the process of photosynthesis,
and soils contain decomposed plant life that is transformed into soil organic matter.
4 Kyoto protocol, article 6.
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through the clean development mechanism involving investments in emission
reductions or sinks in developing countries that have ratified the protocol.5
Under the protocol, Canada has agreed to lower annual GHG emissions during
the 2008 to 2012 “commitment period” to 6 percent below 1990 levels.6 Assuming
“business-as-usual” emissions of approximately 800 million tonnes or megatonnes
(MT) of CO2 equivalent emissions in 2010, this commitment requires a reduction of
240 MT annually by the end of this decade.7 Although the achievement of this
objective represents a significant challenge for Canadian individuals, businesses,
and governments, it also promises a more efficient and environmentally sustainable
economy through which Canada will contribute to a concerted international effort
to limit global warming.
In order to achieve this objective, the Canadian government has established
specific reduction targets and proposed various policy instruments in its climate
change action plan released in November 2002.8 According to this document,
Canadian individuals, businesses, and governments should achieve annual reductions
of 80 MT from actions initiated in the government’s 2000 action plan9 and the 2001
federal budget,10 another 100 MT from new actions announced in the 2002 action
plan, and a further 60 MT from other measures both underway and anticipated.11
Proposed instruments for the reduction of GHGs include (1) “innovation and
technology investments” to increase energy efficiency (production, distribution,
and conservation) and develop cleaner sources of energy; (2) “infrastructure investments” involving urban public transit, intermodal transportation of goods, and the
capture and storage of GHGs; (3) the creation of a “Partnership Fund” to “co-invest
and collaborate on emissions reductions projects”; (4) voluntary agreements and
the establishment of a domestic emissions trading system linked to the international carbon market to be established under the Kyoto protocol; and (5) “targeted
measures” involving information (such as labelling), incentives, regulations, and
tax measures.12
Although the climate change action plan identifies tax measures as one of the
policy instruments through which it plans to meet its reduction targets, these
measures appear to be few and solely in the form of tax incentives for environmentally

5 Ibid., article 12.
6 Ibid., article 3 and annex B.
7 Canada, Climate Change Plan for Canada (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services,
2002), 13.
8 Ibid.
9 Canada, Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services,
2000).
10 Canada, Department of Finance, 2001 Budget, Budget Plan, December 10, 2001.
11 Climate Change Plan for Canada, supra note 7, at 11-15.
12 Ibid., at 15-17.
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preferred consumption or investment.13 Indeed, aside from the proposed emissions
trading system, the main instruments on which the Canadian government intends
to rely in order to meet its commitment under the Kyoto protocol involve public
spending,14 voluntary agreements,15 and public information programs.16 Absent
from the plan are various environmentally related taxes that have been introduced
or proposed in Canada or other developed countries.17
This article seeks to contribute to the Canadian government’s climate change
action plan by considering the role that tax policy can play in helping to meet
Canada’s commitments under the Kyoto accord. The second part of the article
provides a general justification for environmental taxes and tax incentives to address
environmental challenges, concluding that these can serve a useful role alongside
other environmental policy measures such as direct regulation, voluntary agreements, information campaigns, and emissions trading regimes. The third part
reviews existing and potential tax measures in Canada and other developed countries that are directed at the problem of global warming, considering their likely

13 The only specific example provided in the document involves an existing exemption in the
federal excise tax for ethanol in gasoline. Ibid., at 17. While the plan also discusses the
possibility of various financial incentives, it does not indicate whether these would be delivered
in the form of tax incentives or through direct grants. See, for example, ibid., at 26 (discussing
incentives for retrofits of residential housing); and at 35 (mentioning a “financial incentive
program to sequester . . . CO2 into long-term storage”). More recently, the federal government
announced a financial incentive for energy-efficient retrofits of residential buildings in the
form of direct grants. See the Office of Energy Efficiency Web site at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/.
14 See Climate Change Plan for Canada, supra note 7, at 23 (infrastructure funding for public transit);
and at 36 (explaining that the “Government of Canada is prepared to consider participation in
suitable clean coal demonstration projects, whether through the retrofit of an existing plant
and/or the construction of a new generating station”).
15 See ibid., at 21 (stating that “the Government of Canada will negotiate targets for the introduction
of more fuel-efficient vehicles into the Canadian market with automobile manufacturers”); at 23
(discussing “voluntary performance agreements” to promote more efficient transportation of
goods); at 29 (discussing voluntary targets for energy-efficiency improvements by large industrial
emitters); at 30 (proposing that targets for emission reductions by large industrial emitters be
“established through covenants with a regulatory or financial backstop”); and at 8 (discussing
“voluntary energy efficiency targets” for small and medium-sized enterprises and “voluntary
targets to reduce fugitive emissions” of waste gases during oil and gas production and
exploration, as well as from small leaks in natural gas equipment, lines and storage tanks).
16 See, for example, ibid., at 21 (suggesting that the Canadian government will work with other
levels of government and the private sector “to provide better information” on the fuel
economy of passenger vehicles).
17 According to one definition, “[a] tax falls into the category environmental if the tax base is a
physical unit (or a proxy for it) of something that has a proven specific negative impact on the
environment, when used or released.” ATW-Research, “Manual: Statistics on Environmental
Taxes” (commissioned by the European Commission, 1996), cited in Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Taxes and Green Tax Reform (Paris:
OECD, 1997), 18. More generally, the OECD defines “environmentally related taxes” as
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effectiveness to reduce GHG emissions or enhance carbon sinks. The fourth part
returns to the Canadian government’s climate change action plan, suggesting ways
in which tax measures can contribute to each of the areas for which action is
proposed under the plan: (1) transportation; (2) housing and commercial/institutional buildings; (3) large industrial emitters (including incentives for renewable
energy and cleaner fossil fuels); (4) small and medium-sized enterprises and fugitive
emissions; (5) agriculture, forestry, and landfills; and (6) international emission reductions. The fifth part offers general conclusions on the role of tax policy in reducing
global warming.

E N V I R O N M E N TA L T A X E S A N D T A X I N C E N T I V E S
In public discourse and scholarly literature, taxes are widely regarded as unwelcome but necessary burdens that must be imposed in order to obtain revenues to
finance essential public expenditures. From this perspective, it is often suggested,
taxes should affect market outcomes as little as possible, applying to broad-based

compulsory payments to governments “on tax-bases deemed to be of particular environmental
relevance.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmentally Related
Taxes in OECD Countries: Issues and Strategies (Paris: OECD, 2001), 15. For useful discussions
of environmental taxes in the Canadian context, see Canada, Economic Instruments for
Environmental Protection: Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1992); D.N. Dewees,
“Taxation and the Environment,” in Richard M. Bird and Jack M. Mintz, eds., Taxation to 2000
and Beyond, Canadian Tax Paper no. 93 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1992), 29-60;
Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Environment and Taxation Working Group, Final Report—
Environment and Taxation (Toronto: Ontario Fair Tax Commission, December 1992); Ontario,
Fair Taxation in a Changing World: Report of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press in cooperation with the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1993), chapter 25;
Arthur Donner and Fred Lazar, “The Economic Effects of an Environment Tax,” in Allan M.
Maslove, ed., Taxes as Instruments of Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in
cooperation with the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1994), 93-166; Canada, Report of the
Technical Committee on Business Taxation (Ottawa: Department of Finance, April 1998), chapter 9;
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Toward a Canadian Agenda for
Ecological Fiscal Reform: First Steps (Ottawa: National Round Table on the Environment and the
Economy, 2002); and Amy Taylor (with Robert Hornung and Stephanie Cairns), Environmental
Tax Shifting in Canada: Theory and Application (Calgary: Pembina Institute for Appropriate
Development, 2003). For reviews of environmentally related taxes in other developed countries,
see Jean-Philippe Barde and Nils Axel Braathen, “Environmentally Related Levies,” paper
prepared for the conference on Excise Tax Policy and Administration, sponsored by the Research
Centre for Economic and Financial Policy of Erasmus University Rotterdam and the International
Tax and Investment Center, held at the Ministry of Finance, The Hague, April 11-12, 2002;
Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra; J. Andrew Hoerner and Benoît Bosquet,
Environmental Tax Reform: The European Experience (Washington, DC: Center for a Sustainable
Economy, 2001); European Environment Agency, Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments in
Tools for Integration (Copenhagen: EEA, November 2000); Environmental Taxes and Green Tax
Reform, supra; and European Environment Agency, Environmental Taxes: Implementation and
Environmental Effectiveness (Copenhagen: EEA, 1996). See also the database of environmentally
related taxes on the OECD Web site at http://www.oecd.org/.
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measures of economic well-being such as income, consumption, or wealth.18 Moreover, to the extent that market outcomes are regarded as presumptively efficient,
tax incentives are often dismissed as questionable departures from tax neutrality,
distorting market signals and reducing aggregate welfare.19
Notwithstanding these perspectives on taxation and tax incentives, a number of
arguments can be advanced in favour of environmental taxes and tax incentives to
address environmental challenges. The following discussion reviews these arguments, as well as their implications for the design of environmental taxes and tax
incentives and the interaction of these measures with other environmental policy
instruments.

Environmental Taxation
Among economists, environmental taxation is typically justified as a way to internalize negative externalities, requiring economic actors to take the full costs of
their behaviour into account when determining their actions.20 To the extent that
activities such as production, transportation, or consumption impose environmental costs that are not taken into account by those engaging in the activity, economic
analysis suggests that economic actors will engage in too much of the activity,
equating marginal benefits with marginal private costs while ignoring environmental costs. In these circumstances, environmental taxes may improve economic
efficiency by requiring economic actors to confront the full costs of their actions.
In addition to this economic rationale, environmental taxes are also justified on
grounds of justice and morality.21 According to the “polluter-pays principle,” for
example, those who cause harm to the environment should bear the cost of measures both to remedy this harm and to minimize future harm.22 Formally adopted

18 See, for example, Robin W. Boadway and Harry M. Kitchen, Canadian Tax Policy, 3d ed.,
Canadian Tax Paper no. 103 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999), chapter 2.
19 See, for example, the discussion of the “universal market efficiency” approach in Edward A.
Zelinsky, “Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives” (1986) vol. 64,
no. 5 Texas Law Review 973-1037, at 980-86.
20 For a useful summary of this argument for environmental taxation, see Environmentally Related
Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 21-31. For a critical evaluation of this justification
for environmental taxation, see J. Andrew Hoerner, Harnessing the Tax Code for Environmental
Protection: A Survey of State Initiatives (Washington, DC: Center for a Sustainable Economy,
1998), 4-8.
21 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 8-11.
22 See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic
Instruments for Environmental Protection (Paris: OECD, 1989), 27 (“the polluter should bear the
cost of measures to reduce pollution decided upon by public authorities to ensure that the
environment is in an acceptable state”); Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17,
at 19 (“In accordance with the ‘polluter pays principle,’ it was considered appropriate that the
cost of regulation and treatment should be paid by those being regulated”); Hoerner, supra
note 20, at 9 (“polluters . . . and not the innocent public, should be required to pay the costs of
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by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1974,23
this principle regards the environment as a common resource for the use of which
polluters must compensate the public. From this perspective, as J. Andrew Hoerner
explains, environmental taxes are “a way of asserting our common ownership of the
environmental commons”24 and fairly allocating the costs of environmental damage
among those responsible for this damage.25
A third rationale for environmental taxation emphasizes the educational and
transformative role of environmental taxes, conveying information about environmentally harmful activities, fostering different attitudes regarding the costs and
benefits of these activities, and encouraging alternative activities with less deleterious environmental consequences.26 Unlike the narrower economic rationale for
environmental taxation, which regards environmental harms as a cost to be taken
into account by those engaging in economic activities, and the polluter-pays principle, which views environmental harms as injuries that must be compensated, this
transformative rationale for environmental taxation views these harms as regrettable
consequences of economic development that can be minimized by different attitudes and concerted efforts at environmentally sensitive practices. On this account,
it follows, the main purpose of environmental taxes is not to internalize costs or
assign blame for environmental harms, but to encourage environmental awareness
and shared responsibility for creating a better environmental future.27
Not surprisingly, these justifications for environmental taxation have different
implications for the design of these taxes. According to the economic rationale, for
example, environmental taxes should in theory be levied at a rate equal to the

environmental cleanup and the associated monitoring and compliance costs”); and Environmentally
Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 16 (“This principle means that the polluter
should bear the expenses of carrying out [pollution prevention and control] measures decided
by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state”). See also
Sanford E. Gaines, “The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental
Ethos” (1991) vol. 26 Texas International Law Journal 463-96. While there is also an economic
rationale to the polluter-pays principle to the extent that it allocates the costs of compliance
and treatment to those responsible for environmental harm, the very use of the word “polluter”
reflects an underlying ethical dimension.
23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Recommendation of the Council
on Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle,” recommendation C(74)223, adopted
November 14, 1974.
24 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 12.
25 Ibid., at 9 (“When the polluter-pays principle is treated as a moral doctrine, environmental
taxes can play a key role in ensuring that the burdens of past and current pollution are fairly
distributed”).
26 See, for example, ibid., at 14-16.
27 See, for example, Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17, at 9 (explaining that
environmental taxes “provide ‘soft signals’ that increase attention, awareness and concern about
the environmental issues to which they relate”).
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external environmental cost associated with each activity at the margin.28 In practice, however, these “Pigouvian” taxes are exceedingly difficult to implement, given
incomplete information on environmental impacts and differing value judgments
regarding the measurement of known impacts. Whether the measurement of these
costs should include impacts on future generations and other living beings, for
example, cannot be resolved by economic analysis. Nor can economic analysis determine whether environmental costs should be measured by an affected population’s
willingness to pay to be free from environmental harm (which assumes a polluter’s
right to pollute) or its willingness to accept a payment in order to suffer the harm
(which assumes a basic right to be free from pollution). As a result, therefore, more
policy-oriented economists generally suggest that environmental taxes should be
set at a level that is sufficient to induce whatever reduction in environmental harm
is desired by the relevant policy maker.29 As a general rule, this approach favours a
close connection between the tax and the decisions having an impact on the environmental objective,30 and careful attention to the own-price elasticities of products
and activities subject to taxation and the cross-price elasticities of substitutes for
these products and activities.31
In contrast to the economic rationale for environmental taxation, the polluterpays principle is concerned less about incentives than about compensation. From
this perspective, environmental taxes constitute a form of user fee to finance the
costs of regulation, monitoring, cleanup, and compensation to injured parties.32
While the imposition of these taxes is likely to increase efficiency by internalizing
negative externalities, these advantages are, as Hoerner observes, “ancillary to their
main purpose, which is to fairly allocate environmental control and remediation
costs.”33
As compared with the economic rationale for environmental taxation and the
polluter-pays principle, the transformative rationale for environmental taxation is
less categorical in its implications for the design of environmental taxes. While
sharing with the economic rationale an emphasis on incentives and behavioural

28 See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1920).
29 See, for example, William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy,
2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
30 Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, supra note 17, at 52. See also Environmentally
Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 25 (suggesting that it is preferable “to tax the
behaviour to be influenced as directly as possible, in order to enhance the chance of actually
influencing behaviour”).
31 Own-price elasticities measure the decrease in an activity or product acquired in response to an
increase in its price. Cross-price elasticities measure the increase in another activity or product
acquired in response to an increase in the price of the activity or product. As a general rule,
elasticities increase over time as economic actors respond to different price signals.
32 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 10.
33 Ibid.
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responses, the transformative rationale is less concerned with price elasticities per
se than with the combined effect of environmental taxes and other policy measures
on environmental attitudes and practices. Instead of requiring those engaged in
environmentally harmful activities to account for the full environmental costs of
their actions, therefore, this approach might recommend more modest taxes combined with informational campaigns and other measures such as tax incentives to
encourage those affected by the taxes to adopt more environmentally sensitive
alternatives.34 Nor is the transformative rationale for environmental taxation satisfied
with the static efficiency produced by the internalization of negative externalities,
aiming instead at more fundamental changes involving environmentally sensitive
attitudes and practices and technological advances that reduce the costs of environmental protection over time. For this reason, a transformative approach to environmental taxation is likely to combine taxes on environmentally harmful activities
and products with other policies designed to encourage environmental awareness and
practices and to foster environmentally beneficial technological improvements.
As the previous paragraph suggests, different rationales for environmental taxation also have different implications for the relationship between environmental
taxes and other policies to prevent environmental damage. The economic rationale, for example, tends to regard environmental taxation as an efficient alternative
to both traditional “command and control” regulation and voluntary agreements to
reduce environmental damage. While regulatory measures tend to impose a single
set of standards on different economic actors and create little or no incentive to
achieve further improvements beyond stipulated requirements, environmental taxes
promote static efficiency by minimizing the aggregate costs of environmental protection35 and dynamic efficiencies by creating ongoing incentives to reduce environmental
damage whenever the costs of so doing are less than the taxes otherwise payable.36
34 Ibid., at 15 (noting that the educational effect of the tax and related programs “is often sufficient
to induce significant environmental improvement” notwithstanding that the economic impact
of the tax itself may be “quite small”).
35 According to economic analysis, the aggregate costs of environmental protection are minimized
where the costs incurred by each party are equal at the margin (since larger marginal costs to
achieve a given level of protection by one party could otherwise be spent more efficiently by
another party for whom the marginal cost to achieve the same level of environmental protection
is less). Since a rational economic actor faced with an environmental tax can be expected to
invest in environmental protection where its cost is less than the tax and pay the tax where the
amount of the tax is less than the cost of environmental protection, an environmental tax can
be expected to induce economic actors to spend up to the same marginal cost on environmental
protection equal to the amount of the tax, thereby minimizing the aggregate costs of a given
level of environmental protection.
36 See, for example, Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, supra note 17, at 14-16;
Dewees, supra note 17, at 30-42; and Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra
note 17, at 22-24. Environmental taxes also encourage substitution away from environmentally
harmful activities and products through their effect on relative prices. To the extent that
environmental regulations increase the costs of activities that are subject to these regulations,
this efficiency may also result from regulatory measures.
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Similarly, although voluntary approaches provide economic actors with greater flexibility to achieve stipulated environmental goals, negotiated agreements do little to
minimize the aggregate costs of environmental protection and provide no incentive to reduce environmental damage beyond negotiated requirements.37 For these
reasons, economic analyses generally regard regulatory and voluntary approaches to
environmental protection as “inferior to environmental taxes in addressing environmental objectives.”38
The economic rationale for environmental taxation also does not favour the
earmarking of environmental tax revenues to environmental purposes, since this
practice may lessen cost-effective avoidance by those affected by pollution39 and
distort appropriate expenditures to redress and reduce environmental harms—
which have no necessary relationship to the amount of revenue collected by taxes
designed to internalize environmental costs.40 Moreover, the economic rationale is
not readily amenable to direct grants or tax incentives for environmental purposes,
since these subsidies distort price signals and allow economic actors to avoid the
full environmental costs of their actions.41 In contrast, this rationale is generally
sympathetic to the idea of tradable permits, which promise the same static and
dynamic efficiencies as environmental taxes.42 Although a system of tradable permits

37 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 41-42. For a detailed
evaluation of the experience of OECD countries with voluntary approaches to environmental
protection, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Voluntary Approaches
for Environmental Policy: An Assessment (Paris: OECD, 1999) (reporting that negotiated agreements
tend to be poorly enforced and involve substantial administrative and transaction costs to set
up). For a recent critique of voluntary agreements in the Canadian context, see Andrew Green,
“Incentives, Public Goals and Environmental Contracts,” research paper prepared for the
Ontario Panel on the Role of Government (November 2002).
38 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 41 (referring to voluntary
approaches). See also ibid., at 22 (discussing the “theoretical advantage of economic instruments
compared to command and control regulation”).
39 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 5-6.
40 See, for example, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 26
(explaining that “earmarking fixes the use of tax revenue in advance, which creates obstacles for
a re-evaluation based on economic and environmental rationale of a targeted expenditure
programme financed by earmarked revenues, and the frequent result is inefficient spending of
government revenue”).
41 See, for example, Dewees, supra note 17, at 39 (“Whenever the government provides a tax
abatement scheme for pollution control equipment or provides direct cash subsidies for
pollution abatement, it encourages output in an industry that is environmentally harmful. The
effect of such subsidies is likely to be excessive production”). See also Chris Edwards, Ada Rousso,
Peter Merrill, and Elizabeth Wagner, “Cool Code: Federal Tax Incentives To Mitigate Global
Warming” (1998) vol. 51, no. 3 National Tax Journal 465-83, at 475 (“subsidies for pollution
abatement are inherently less efficient than taxes on the pollutants themselves, because the
subsidy causes overproduction of pollution-causing goods”).
42 See the explanation in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 22-24.
In order to ensure that relative prices reflect the environmental costs of different activities and
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might be regarded as a substitute for environmental taxation,43 experience and
reflection suggest that tradable permits and environmental taxes can be combined
in several ways: introducing tradable permits for specific activities or sectors and
environmental taxes for others;44 imposing taxes on environmentally harmful activities even where these are allowed by tradable permits;45 or taxing environmentally
harmful activities that are not sanctioned by tradable permits.46 Moreover, according to one study, the combination of environmental taxation and tradable permits
can be expected to reduce the cost of environmental protection compared to the
cost from environmental taxation alone.47
Like the economic rationale for environmental taxation, the polluter-pays principle is generally antagonistic to voluntary approaches to environmental protection
as well as direct grants or tax incentives that assist polluters in reducing environmental harms. To the extent that negotiated agreements allow contracting parties
to engage in environmentally harmful activities without paying any compensation
for resulting environmental damage, voluntary approaches contradict the very premise
of the polluter-pays principle. Likewise, the idea of subsidizing those who engage
in environmentally harmful activities contradicts the normative judgment that those

products and to prevent windfall gains to existing firms and industries, it is often suggested that
these permits should be purchased by auction. In practice, however, most tradable permits are
generally distributed free of charge.
43 For a useful analysis of the relationship between tradable permits and other environmental policies
including environmental taxes, see Stephen Smith, “The Compatibility of Tradable Permits
with Other Environmental Policy Instruments,” in Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Implementing Domestic Tradable Permits for Environmental Protection (Paris:
OECD, 1999), chapter 10.
44 In the United Kingdom, for example, emission trading has been proposed for energy-intensive
sectors covered by negotiated agreements that confer substantial exemption from the new
climate change levy. Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 43. For
a critical assessment of this method of combining tradable permits and environmental taxes, see
P. Schreiner, “Obstacles to the Implementation of Tradable Permits: The Case of Norway,” in
Implementing Domestic Tradable Permits for Environmental Protection, supra note 43, at chapter 6.
45 In the United States, for example, the federal government levies a tax on ozone-depleting
substances that applies to manufacturers of these substances notwithstanding that they hold
tradable permits authorizing the manufacture of the substances up to a particular amount.
Since the permits were distributed free of charge, the tax was introduced in order to reduce the
windfall gains of manufacturers who received these allowances. For a brief description of this
tax, see Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 43 (box 7).
46 Under this approach, the environmental tax functions as a ceiling on the market price of
tradable permits, since those engaging in economically harmful activities would be expected to
purchase permits as long as the tax exceeds the permit price and pay the tax whenever the
permit price exceeds the tax.
47 Japan, Ministry of the Environment, The Carbon Tax To Reduce GHG Emission: Report of the Study
Group on Economic Instruments in Environmental Policies (Tokyo: Ministry of the Environment,
2000), cited in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 42.

tax policy and global warming

■

2075

who are responsible for environmental damage should bear the costs of its remediation
and prevention. In contrast to the economic rationale, however, the polluter-pays
principle favours the earmarking of environmental taxes to the remediation and
prevention of environmental harms, since these expenditures are consistent with
the character of these taxes as fees for the use of a common resource.48 The polluterpays principle is also compatible with regulatory alternatives to environmental
taxation that limit or prevent the very damages that justify the imposition of environmental taxes as user fees, and with tradable permits, provided that the permits are
not distributed free of charge.
Unlike the economic rationale for environmental taxation and the polluter-pays
principle, the transformative rationale for environmental taxation is compatible
with all other policies to reduce environmental harm. According to this approach, for
example, environmental regulation may be preferable to taxation where the number
of persons engaged in an environmentally harmful activity is few or the policy objective
is to prevent the harm altogether.49 In contrast, where the number of persons
engaged in the activity is large and the policy goal is to reduce the extent of the
harm without preventing it altogether, environmental taxation is generally preferable to regulation.50 Where environmental taxes are imposed at relatively low rates,
however, environmental regulations can support the educational and transformative
aims of these taxes by establishing minimum standards reflecting currently available
technology and practices.51 At the same time, environmental taxation can enhance
regulatory measures, increasing the likelihood of effective enforcement and creating
a dynamic incentive to reduce environmentally harmful activities beyond regulated
levels.52
Moreover, to the extent that environmental taxation is intended to convey information about environmentally harmful activities, foster different attitudes regarding
their costs and benefits, and encourage alternative activities with less deleterious
environmental consequences, environmental taxes are also compatible with voluntary
agreements, tradable permits, informational campaigns, direct grants and tax incentives, and the earmarking of revenues for environmental purposes. Where voluntary
agreements foster environmental awareness and a sense of shared responsibility for
environmental protection, for example, this approach to environmental protection

48 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 10 (“earmarking can ensure that taxation is
proportional to, or sufficient to remedy, harm caused to the public”).
49 See, for example, Fair Taxation in a Changing World, supra note 17, at 554.
50 Ibid.
51 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 16 (“Technology-based regulations embody our
resolve to do the best we can today”). In practice, environmental taxes are often imposed at
relatively low rates on account of political opposition and competitiveness concerns. See, for
example, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 40-41; and
Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17, at 9.
52 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 16-17.
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complements the educational and transformative role of environmental taxes.53
Correspondingly, environmental taxation can support voluntary approaches to environmental protection by creating a financial incentive to negotiate and adhere to
meaningful commitments to reduce environmental harms.54 Tradable permits also
complement the transformative role of environmental taxation by creating ongoing incentives to reduce the cost of environmental protection,55 as do informational
campaigns and subsidies that encourage environmental awareness and practices
and foster environmentally beneficial technological improvements. 56 The
transformative rationale for environmental taxation is also consistent with the earmarking of revenues for environmental purposes, particularly where these revenues
are used to encourage environmentally sensitive practices and technological improvements that reduce the cost of environmental protection over time.57 Besides
improving the environmental effectiveness of environmental taxes,58 earmarking
may also improve the political acceptability of environmental taxation, which might
otherwise be perceived as little more than another source of government revenue.59

53 Notwithstanding its concerns about voluntary agreements, for example, the OECD acknowledges
that voluntary approaches to environmental protection “are likely to generate significant ‘soft
effects’ in terms of the dissemination of information, innovation diffusion and awareness raising.”
Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 48, note 10.
54 In Denmark and the United Kingdom, for example, exemptions from taxes on energy and carbon
are granted to industries that enter into negotiated agreements to increase energy efficiency.
Ibid., at 41. Similarly, the Climate Change Plan for Canada, supra note 7, at 30, contemplates a
“financial backstop” to reinforce negotiated agreements with large industrial emitters of GHGs.
55 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 15 (observing that modest taxes on environmentally
injurious activities are often combined with “campaign[s] to educate the relevant population
about available alternatives, often funded by the tax”). According to one study, the recycling of
revenues from a carbon tax into investments in energy-efficient technologies is likely to
significantly reduce the costs of reducing CO2 emissions compared to a carbon tax alone. The
Carbon Tax To Reduce GHG Emission, supra note 47, cited in Environmentally Related Taxes in
OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 44.
57 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 16 (explaining that “taxes on emissions that remain
after mandatory controls and tax incentives for investments in new clean technologies . . . can,
when properly integrated with more conventional regulatory approaches, play an important
role in policy packages that meet our pressing immediate environmental concerns while
placing us on the path to meeting our long-term environmental aspirations”).
58 See, for example, ibid., at 10 (reporting that “empirical work has suggested that earmarked taxes
appear [to] provide a more effective incentive for emission reductions than a strict economic
analysis would suggest”). See also M.S. Anderson, “Governance by Green Taxes: Implementing
Clean Water Policies in Europe 1970-1990” (1999) vol. 2, no. 1 Environmental Economics and
Policy Studies 39-63 (concluding that earmarking of revenues was a significant factor in the
relative success of the Dutch system of water-related charges compared to the Danish and
Belgian systems, improving cooperation between polluters and regulators and easing the
transition to lower levels of pollution).
59 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 26.
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Although these rationales for environmental taxation have different implications
for the design of environmental taxes and the interaction of these taxes with other
environmental policy instruments, each has a role to play in a general justification
for these taxes as instruments of environmental policy. Where marginal environmental costs are easily determined, for example, efficiency considerations provide a
persuasive rationale for environmental taxes to internalize negative externalities.
Even where marginal environmental costs are not easily determined, at least some
level of environmental taxation may be more likely to promote economic efficiency
than no tax at all. Attention to the price elasticities of different products and activities
is also advisable where the goal of environmental taxation is to effect behavioural
change. To the extent that human behaviour is also shaped by factors other than
marginal costs and benefits, however, justifications for environmental taxes would
do well to take into account their educational and transformative role as well as
estimates of price elasticities.60 For this reason, as well, one might question the
weight of economic objections to environmental policies other than environmental
taxes and tradable permits.61 Although efficiency considerations may favour environmental taxation in many circumstances, other approaches to environmental
protection may also be useful complements to environmental taxes that serve
educational and transformative purposes.62
In addition to economic and transformative rationales for environmental taxation,
the polluter-pays principle provides a powerful justification for environmental
taxes where environmental damage is clearly established and moral responsibility is
readily assigned, although regulatory fines and criminal penalties are often preferable
in this context. Where environmental harms represent regrettable consequences of
economic development, however, the polluter-pays principle seems inappropriately
individualistic, while the transformative rationale provides a convincing justification
for environmental taxes to encourage environmental awareness and shared responsibility for environmental protection.63 For the same reason, the aversion of the
polluter-pays principle to voluntary agreements and subsidies to encourage environmental protection might also be challenged.
In practice, environmental taxes are typically justified on various grounds—
economic and moral, as well as transformative.64 Moreover, notwithstanding economic or moral objections, these taxes are usually applied in combination with other
environmental policy instruments, including environmental regulations, voluntary
agreements, tradable permits, information campaigns, direct grants and tax incentives,

60 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
61 See the discussion supra at notes 35 to 47 and accompanying text.
62 See the discussion supra at notes 48 to 59 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
64 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 4-25.
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and the earmarking of revenues to environmental purposes.65 While this variety of
rationales and policy instruments might be regarded as arbitrary and inefficient,66 it
also reflects a multiplicity of circumstances in which environmental protection is
warranted and a concomitant diversity in the methods through which this protection
is best pursued. In the analysis that follows, therefore, this article adopts a pluralistic approach to the justification for environmental taxation and a complementary
perspective on the relationship between environmental taxes and other environmental policy instruments.

Environmental Tax Incentives
Unlike other tax provisions, which define the amount or transaction subject to tax
and the rate or rates at which the tax applies, tax incentives represent deliberate
departures from otherwise applicable taxes in order to encourage the activity at which
the incentive is directed. For this reason, these subsidies are accurately described as
“tax expenditures” and properly evaluated like any other public spending program,
by weighing the public goals pursued by the program against its cost and overall
effectiveness in promoting these goals.67 In order to justify a tax incentive for environmental purposes, therefore, it is necessary to defend both a public subsidy for
the product or activity that the incentive is designed to encourage and the delivery
of this subsidy in the form of a tax incentive rather than direct government spending.
Beginning with the first of these issues, at least three reasons can be advanced to
support public subsidies for environmentally sensitive behaviour.
First, to the extent that certain kinds of activities generate public benefits in
addition to those enjoyed by the persons engaging in the activity, economic analysis suggests that a subsidy may be appropriate to encourage a socially efficient
quantity of the activity by internalizing these positive externalities.68 For this reason,
for example, governments often subsidize the research and development of new
products and processes, the benefits from which are typically enjoyed by third parties
as well as those incurring the cost of the research and development. For this reason as
well, it may be economically efficient to subsidize both research and development

65 Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17, at 9. See also Environmentally Related
Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 40-45.
66 See, for example, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 30 and 45
(questioning the efficiency of policy mixes that produce “wasteful policy overlap”).
67 See, for example, Stanley S. Surrey, “Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures” (1970) vol. 83, no. 4 Harvard
Law Review 705-38; Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel,
Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
68 See, for example, the discussion of positive externalities in Zelinsky, supra note 19, at 1005-8.
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regarding environmentally sensitive processes and technologies,69 and environmentally sensitive forms of consumption and production that yield public benefits
in the form of reduced environmental harm.70
A second reason to subsidize environmentally sensitive products and activities is
to encourage dynamic efficiencies resulting from reductions in the cost of these
products and activities over time. To the extent that subsidies increase the demand
for new products and activities, output is likely to increase and costs can be expected
to fall with increasing economies of scale. For this reason, subsidies for environmentally sensitive products and activities may be supported on the grounds that they
accelerate market penetration of new technologies, creating a more mature market
for these technologies and reducing the costs of environmental protection.71
Moreover, where an expanding market causes the cost of an emerging clean technology to be lowered to a level that is comparable with that of environmentally
harmful technologies currently in use, subsidies and other environmental policies
can “ ‘flip’ the clean technology from the low-production, high-cost state to a
stable high-production, low-cost state, with corresponding benefit to the environment and the economy.”72 As the cost effectiveness of subsidies for this purpose
depends on the extent to which demand for the clean technology increases as a
result of the subsidy, attention to price elasticities is crucial in this context.73
A third rationale for environmental subsidies emphasizes their educational and
transformative function, conveying information about environmentally preferred
products and activities, fostering different attitudes toward environmentally sensitive and harmful products and activities, and encouraging environmentally sensitive

69 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 18 (explaining that “production of new environmental
technologies yields a positive technological externality that provides a benefit to the public”).
70 Ibid. Although environmental taxes represent a more efficient response to the negative
externalities associated with environmental harms, the use of subsidies to reduce these harms
may be efficiency enhancing where environmental taxes are levied at low rates or not at all.
71 See, for example, United States, Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,
Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative: Fiscal Year 2001 (Washington, DC: Energy
Information Administration, 2000), x (characterizing “the intended purpose” of the Clinton
administration’s climate change technology initiative [CCTI] as “encouraging the penetration
of [new and environmentally sensitive] technologies, reducing costs, and creating a more mature
market”). See also Hoerner, supra note 20, at 18-19 (explaining that the goal of these incentives
“is not to find the optimal balance between the cost of emissions reductions and the benefits of
environmental improvements at a given level of technology, but rather to achieve a market
transformation that makes clean production cheaper and relaxes the environment/economy
tradeoff ”).
72 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 18.
73 Where demand for the clean technology is price inelastic, the effect of a subsidy is to provide a
windfall to those who would have acquired the technology in any event. In contrast, where
demand is highly elastic, the subsidy can induce sufficient market penetration and cost reductions
to justify its cost.
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behavioural changes. Where established practices cause environmental harms, for
example, subsidies and other environmental policies can encourage environmentally
sensitive alternatives by increasing awareness and encouraging institutional changes
that make these alternatives less costly and more feasible.74
Although one or more of these rationales might justify a subsidy for environmental purposes, it is not obvious why such a subsidy should be delivered in the form
of a tax incentive rather than a direct grant. Indeed, tax incentives are often criticized
on the grounds that they increase the complexity of tax legislation, establish openended budgetary commitments, lack effective accountability, bypass traditional
legislative controls on budgetary expenditures, and portray as tax reductions what
are in effect spending programs.75 Moreover, where tax incentives take the form of
exemptions, deductions, or deferrals from progressive income taxes, these measures are justifiably regarded as regressive “upside-down” subsidies that confer a
greater benefit on taxpayers with high incomes than on those with low incomes.76
While these concerns suggest that direct grants are preferable to tax incentives
in many contexts, they do not rule out all tax incentives. Where an incentive is
introduced and monitored in a manner similar to a spending program, for example,
with its cost estimated in advance and reviewed regularly thereafter through annual
tax expenditure budgets, concerns about accountability and transparency are greatly
reduced.77 Moreover, where the amount of the incentive does not depend on the
taxpayer’s level of income, concerns about the equitable distribution of the associated
tax benefits are similarly allayed.78 In these circumstances, in fact, tax incentives
may be preferred to direct grants on the grounds that they facilitate more decentralized forms of decision making and are less costly for governments to promote
and administer.79 Whether these advantages are actually satisfied in the context of a
particular tax incentive, however, depends on the design of the incentive and the

74 See, for example, Hoerner, supra note 20, at 19-20.
75 See, for example, Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform, supra note 67, at 126-54.
76 See, for example, Surrey, “Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy,”
supra note 67, at 720-25.
77 Both Canada and the United States publish annual estimates of tax expenditures, measuring
their cost in terms of forgone revenues. For a useful history of the origins of these tax
expenditure budgets, see Jonathan Barry Forman, “Origins of the Tax Expenditure Budget”
(1986) vol. 30, no. 6 Tax Notes 537-45. For a recent proposal to extend the concept to include
the costs of regulatory measures, see Julie Roin, “Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax
Expenditure Budget,” Hastings Law Journal (forthcoming) (available online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=350981).
78 This is the case, for example, where an incentive takes the form of a refundable tax credit in
computing the taxpayer’s income rather than an exemption, deduction, or deferral in computing
income for tax purposes. Exemptions or deductions in computing flat-rate sales or consumption
taxes also appear to satisfy this concern, although such measures would presumably have
distributional implications.
79 See, for example, Zelinsky, supra note 19, at 1010-12.
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manner of its administration. As a result, these policy choices cannot be made in
the abstract but only by considering the particular incentive in question. The next
part of this article therefore turns to specific taxes and tax incentives to reduce
global warming.

TA X MEA SURE S TO REDUCE GLOBAL WARMING
Among OECD countries, the main category of anthropogenic GHG emissions is
carbon dioxide (CO2), the vast majority of which results from the combustion of
fossil fuels for energy.80 In addition to CO2, other anthropogenic GHGs include
■

■

■

methane (CH 4), most of which results from the anaerobic decomposition of
solid wastes in landfills, the production and distribution of oil and natural gas,
enteric fermentation in ruminants, coal mining, and manure management;81
nitrous oxide (N2O), most of which is attributable to agricultural soil management (including the application of synthetic and organic fertilizers), the
combustion of fossil fuels, the production of nitric acid for synthetic fertilizers,
and manure management;82 and
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6 ), one or more of which is either used as a substitute for ozonedepleting substances (ODS), attributable to the production of ODS substitutes,
used in electrical transmission and distribution, or attributable to the production of aluminum, the manufacture of semiconductors, or the production
of magnesium.83

80 According to the OECD, CO 2 is responsible for over 60 percent of anthropogenic GHG
emissions. Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 117. In the
United States, approximately 82 percent of estimated GHG emissions in 1999 were attributable
to CO2, of which 98 percent resulted from the combustion of fossil fuels. United States,
Department of State, U.S. Climate Action Report—2002 (Washington, DC: Department of
State, May 2002), 37-42. Other sources of CO2 emissions include the production of cement
and lime, the combustion of solid wastes, and natural gas flaring.
81 According to the OECD, CH4 is responsible for approximately 15 to 20 percent of the
greenhouse effect. Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 117. In
the United States, CH4 accounted for approximately 9 percent of CO2 equivalent GHG
emissions in 1999. Of these emissions, approximately 35 percent were attributable to landfills,
23 percent to the production of oil and natural gas, 20 percent to enteric fermentation in
ruminants, 10 percent to coal mining, and 6 percent to manure management. U.S. Climate
Action Report—2002, supra note 80, at 42-45. Other sources of CH4 emissions include
wastewater treatment, rice cultivation, and the combustion of automotive fuels.
82 In the United States, N2O accounted for approximately 6 percent of total GHG emissions in
1999. Of these emissions, almost 70 percent were attributable to agricultural soil management,
18 percent to the combustion of fossil fuels, 5 percent to the production of nitric acid, and 4 percent
to manure management. U.S. Climate Action Report—2002, supra note 80, at 45-46.
83 In the United States, these gases accounted for approximately 2 percent of total GHG emissions
in 1999. Of these emissions, over 40 percent were attributable to ODS substitutes, approximately
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While GHG emissions contribute to global warming, the enhancement of carbon
sinks can offset this effect by removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Although forests are the most important carbon sink, agricultural soils serve this
function as well.84
The following sections review existing and potential tax measures designed to
address global warming by reducing GHG emissions and enhancing carbon sinks,
considering both taxes and tax incentives. Rather than examining each tax and
incentive in detail, the purpose of this survey is to provide a general description of
the most promising tax measures and their expected effectiveness in reducing
global warming.

Taxes
As the combustion of fossil fuels for energy constitutes the leading source of anthropogenic GHG emissions in OECD countries, it is not surprising that fossil fuels and
energy consumption are the main targets of environmental taxes to reduce global
warming. This section considers taxes on fossil fuels and energy consumption as
well as taxes on other sources of GHG emissions.
Taxes on Fossil Fuels and Energy Consumption
Among OECD countries, the most significant taxes on fossil fuels and energy
consumption apply to automotive fuels and motor vehicles.85 In addition to these
taxes, several countries have contemplated or introduced broader taxes on energy
and other fossil fuels.86
Automotive Fuel Taxes
Beginning with taxes on automotive fuels, rates vary widely from one country to
another and also among different fuels. In Europe, for example, tax rates for unleaded
gasoline as of January 1, 2000 ranged from a low of approximately Cdn 56 cents per
litre in Greece to almost Cdn $1.25 per litre in the United Kingdom.87 In Canada

22 percent to the production of HFC-22 (an ODS substitute), 19 percent to electrical
transmission and distribution, 7.5 percent to the production of aluminum, 5 percent to the
manufacture of semiconductors, and 4.5 percent to the production of magnesium. Ibid., at 46-47.
84 In the United States, improved forest management practices and management of agricultural
soils are estimated to have resulted in net sequestration of approximately 15 percent of gross
GHG emissions in 1999, over 90 percent of which was attributable to forests. Ibid., at 42.
85 See, for example, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 55 (reporting
that taxes on automotive fuels and motor vehicles accounted for 90 percent of environmentally
related tax revenues in OECD countries in 1995).
86 See, for example, ibid., at 55-56 and 58-60.
87 See the database of environmentally related taxes on the OECD Web site at http://
www.oecd.org/. Tax rates are converted to Canadian currency based on an exchange rate in
April 2003 of €1 = Cdn$1.58701.
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and the United States, rates are considerably lower at Cdn 10 cents per litre of
unleaded gasoline at the federal level in Canada88 and approximately Cdn 7 cents
per litre at the federal level in the United States.89 Although provincial and territorial
governments in Canada and state governments in the United States also levy excise
taxes on automotive fuels, rates for unleaded gasoline vary between Cdn 6.2 cents
and Cdn 16.5 cents per litre in Canada,90 and approximately Cdn 3 cents and Cdn 12
cents per litre in the United States,91 meaning that combined automotive fuel taxes
by both levels of government are significantly lower than applicable rates throughout Europe.
With respect to taxes on different fuels, leaded gasoline is uniformly subject to
higher rates than unleaded gasoline,92 while diesel fuel is generally taxed at lower
rates than other fuels.93 Moreover, in recent years, governments have introduced

88 Excise Tax Act (Canada), RSC 1985, c. E-15, as amended (herein referred to as “ETA”),
subsection 23(1) and schedule II, paragraph 9(a).
89 US motor fuel excise tax rates available online at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/motor_fl.html
(US 18.4 cents per gallon). Tax rates are converted to litres and Canadian currency based on an
exchange rate in April 2003 of US $1 = Cdn $1.447.
90 The lowest rate for unleaded gasoline is in Yukon Territory and the highest is in Newfoundland
and Labrador. In Ontario, unleaded gasoline is taxed at a rate of 14.7 percent. Although
automobile fuels are not subject to separate retail sales taxes imposed in most Canadian provinces,
they are subject to the federal goods and services tax (GST), a 7 percent value-added tax that
applies to the total consideration paid for the supply of fuel in Canada, including federal and
provincial fuel taxes. In Quebec, which levies its own value-added tax, as well as New Brunswick,
Newfoundland and Labrador, and Nova Scotia, which have harmonized their sales taxes with the
federal GST, these taxes also apply to automobile fuel as well as federal and provincial fuel taxes.
91 See the US motor fuel excise tax rates available online at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/
motor_fl.html. The lowest rate for unleaded gasoline (US 7.5 cents per gallon) is found in the
state of Georgia and the highest (US 31 cents per gallon) in the state of Rhode Island. In key
border states like Michigan, New York, and Ohio, state tax rates on unleaded fuel range from
Cdn 7.2 cents per litre (US 19 cents per gallon in Michigan) to Cdn 8.7 cents per litre (US 22.6
cents per gallon in New York State). Tax rates are converted to litres and Canadian currency
based on an exchange rate in April 2003 of US $1 = Cdn $1.447.
92 In the United Kingdom, for example, the tax rate for leaded gasoline as of January 1, 2000 was
almost Cdn $1.40 per litre, compared to Cdn $1.24 per litre for unleaded gasoline. See the
database of environmentally related taxes on the OECD Web site at http://www.oecd.org/. Tax
rates are converted to Canadian currency based on an exchange rate in April 2003 of € 1 =
Cdn $1.58701. Likewise in Canada, leaded gasoline is subject to a federal tax of Cdn 11 cents
per litre compared to Cdn 10 cents per litre for unleaded gasoline. See ETA subsection 23(1)
and schedule II, paragraphs 9(a) and (b). In Ontario, leaded gasoline is taxed at a rate of
Cdn 17.7 cents per litre, compared to Cdn 14.7 cents per litre for unleaded gasoline. Gasoline
Tax Act (Ontario), RSO 1990, c. G.5, as amended, section 2(1).
93 See, for example, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 57, figure 7.
In Germany, for example, automotive fuel taxes in 2000 were approximately Cdn60 cents per litre
for diesel fuel and Cdn89 cents per litre for unleaded gasoline. See the database of environmentally
related taxes on the OECD Web site at http://www.oecd.org/. Tax rates are converted to
Canadian currency based on an exchange rate in April 2003 of € 1 = Cdn $1.58701. In Canada,
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reduced rates or exemptions for clean-burning and renewable fuels such as ethanol
and methanol and biodiesel fuels of non-fossil fuel origin. In Norway, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom, for example, diesel fuel rates vary according to the sulphur
content of the fuel.94 In the United States, automotive fuels that meet stipulated
alcohol content requirements are subject to a reduced federal fuel tax rate of approximately Cdn 5 cents per litre.95 In Canada, the portion of blended gasoline that is
ethanol or methanol produced from biomass has been exempt from the federal fuel
tax since 1992.96 Consistent with this exemption, the 2003 federal budget proposed
to remove the federal excise tax on diesel fuel from the biomass-produced ethanol
or methanol portion of blended diesel fuel and to exempt biodiesel fuel and the
biodiesel portion of blended diesel fuel, provided that the biodiesel is of a biological non-fossil fuel origin (such as vegetable oils and animal fats, including recycled
cooking greases).97 Similar exemptions or tax rebates for these clean-burning and
renewable fuels are also available in several provinces and territories.98
Until recently, these taxes have generally been regarded as administratively convenient sources of general revenue or as benefit taxes, the payment of which helps
finance the construction and maintenance of roads and highways.99 Notwithstanding these origins, however, automotive fuel taxes have assumed an increasingly
important environmental character as rates have distinguished between leaded and
unleaded fuels, and reduced rates or exemptions have been introduced for cleanburning and renewable fuels. From an environmental perspective, however, lower
rates for diesel fuel than for gasoline are generally regarded as inappropriate, since
diesel produces larger CO2 emissions per terajoule of energy than gasoline100 and

diesel fuel is subject to a federal tax of Cdn 4 cents per litre compared to Cdn 10 cents per litre
for unleaded gasoline. See ETA subsection 23(1) and schedule II, paragraph 9(a) and section 9.1.
In the United States, on the other hand, diesel fuel is taxed slightly more heavily than unleaded
gasoline both at the federal level and in many states. See the US motor fuel excise tax rates
online at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/motor_fl.html.
94 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 58.
95 Ibid. (reporting a rate of US 13.1 cents per gallon). For a brief explanation of the required alcohol
content of these fuels, see United States, Department of the Treasury, Excise Taxes for 2003,
Internal Revenue Service Publication 510 (revised February 2003), 11-12.
96 ETA section 23.4.
97 Canada, Department of Finance, 2003 Budget, Budget Plan, February 18, 2003, at 343.
98 In Ontario, for example, biodiesel fuel is fully exempt from the province’s fuel tax, whether or
not it is mixed with ordinary diesel fuel. Fuel Tax Act (Ontario), RSO 1990, c. F.35, as amended,
section 2(3.1). In the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, all non-petroleum-based automobile
fuels are completely exempt from tax. See Petroleum Products Tax Act (Northwest Territories),
RSNWT 1988, c. P-5, as amended and as duplicated for Nunavut by section 29 of the
Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c. 28.
99 See, for example, the discussion in Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, supra
note 17, at 9.1-2.
100 Donner and Lazar, supra note 17, at 97.
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much higher emissions of particulates and other pollutants such as ozone (NOx )
and sulphur dioxide (SO2 ).101
Regarding the effectiveness of automotive fuel taxes in reducing GHG emissions,
available evidence is inconclusive but suggestive. On the one hand, US studies
indicating a low price elasticity of demand for gasoline suggest that fuel taxes are
less an effective way to change behaviour than an efficient way to raise revenues.102
European studies, on the other hand, indicate that while the number of kilometres
driven is generally unresponsive to fuel price increases, the demand for gasoline is
relatively price elastic, suggesting that higher fuel taxes encourage more efficient
fuel consumption rather than discouraging driving.103 In the United Kingdom, for
example, one study concluded that increases in fuel taxes in the 1990s contributed
to a 13 percent increase in the average fuel efficiency of heavy trucks between 1993
and 1998.104 As a result, the UK Treasury department projected that scheduled
increases in automotive fuel taxes during the period 1996-2002 would reduce annual
CO 2 emissions from the transport sector by 4.6 to 11.5 percent by 2010.105 In the
United States also, a strong correlation exists between inflation-adjusted gasoline
prices and trends in the fuel efficiency of new vehicles, with significant improvements
in fuel efficiency as gasoline prices increased in the 1970s, followed by a sustained
stagnation in fuel efficiency as real fuel prices fell in the 1980s and 1990s.106
In addition to these effects, it is important to recognize the role that other policies
can play in enhancing the environmental effectiveness of increased taxes on automotive fuels. Where these taxes are accompanied by increased spending on public

101 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 57 (adding that although
diesel-powered vehicles cause lower CO2 emissions per kilometre driven than vehicles powered
by gasoline, this is not an argument for preferential tax treatment for these fuels, since drivers
benefit directly from this fuel consumption advantage).
102 See, for example, Kristin N. Snipes and Robert Mendelsohn, “The Effectiveness of Gasoline
Taxation To Manage Air Pollution” (2001) vol. 36, no. 2 Ecological Economics 299-309, cited in
Barde and Braathen, supra note 17, at paragraph 65 (reporting short-term elasticities of −0.4 to
−0.6 and long-term elasticities of −0.5 to −0.7).
103 See the studies cited in Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17, at 45 (reporting
elasticities in the range of -0.65 to -1.0). Other studies indicating that the number of kilometres
driven is unresponsive to increases in the price of automotive fuel suggest that drivers are apt
to respond to increased fuel taxes by obtaining more energy-efficient vehicles rather than by
driving less.
104 United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Climate
Change—The UK Programme (London: Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions, 2000).
105 United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Treasury, Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report (London: Her
Majesty’s Treasury, 1999); and United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Treasury, Financial Statement and
Budget Report (London: Her Majesty’s Treasury, 1999). After sustained protest by the domestic
trucking industry in the United Kingdom, the scheduled increases were abandoned in 2000.
106 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 103-4, figure 13.
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transportation, for example, improvements in service quality can further the environmental objectives of automotive fuel taxes by encouraging commuters to shift
from private automobiles to public transit. Moreover, where spending programs or
tax incentives support the production and consumption of fuel-efficient and cleanenergy vehicles, these efficiency improvements can make it easier for drivers to
respond to automotive fuel taxes by reducing their consumption of GHG-producing
automotive fuels. For these reasons, it is important to consider the environmental
effectiveness of automotive fuel taxes not in isolation but as one of several possible
measures to address global warming.

Motor Vehicle Taxes
Among other environmental policies directed at reducing GHG emissions from the
combustion of automotive fuels, an increasingly common measure involves taxes
and registration fees on the sale or use of motor vehicles. In the United States, for
example, the federal government levies a gas guzzler tax (GGT) on the sale by the
manufacturer of automobiles with a fuel economy standard as measured by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of less than 22.5 miles per gallon (greater
than approximately 10.5 litres per 100 kilometres).107 Starting at $1,000 for automobiles with a fuel economy of 21.5 to 22.5 miles per gallon (MPG), the tax increases
as fuel economy falls, reaching a maximum of $7,700 for automobiles with a fuel
economy of less than 12.5 MPG (greater than approximately 19 litres per 100 kilometres).108 Similarly, in Canada, Ontario levies a tax for fuel conservation (TFFC) on
the sale or lease of new passenger vehicles and sports-utility vehicles (SUVs) with
highway fuel-use ratings exceeding 6 litres per 100 kilometres for passenger vehicles (less than approximately 39 MPG) and 8 litres per 100 kilometres for SUVs (less
than approximately 29 MPG).109 For passenger vehicles, the tax is $75 for vehicles
with a fuel-use rating of 6 to 9 litres per 100 kilometres (approximately 26 to 39 MPG),
rising to $7,000 for vehicles with ratings over 18 litres per 100 kilometres (less than
approximately 13 MPG). For SUVs, the tax increases from $75 on vehicles with a fueluse rating of 8 to 9 litres per 100 kilometres (approximately 26 to 29 MPG) to $3,200
for vehicles with ratings over 18 litres per 100 kilometres (less than approximately
13 MPG). Moreover, for passenger vehicles with a fuel-use rating less than 6 litres
per 100 kilometres (greater than approximately 39 MPG), Ontario provides a tax
credit for fuel conservation (TCFFC) of $100.110 Other tax incentives for fuelefficient and clean-fuel vehicles are discussed later in this article.111

107 For a brief description of the tax, see Excise Taxes for 2003, supra note 95, at 22-23.
108 Internal Revenue Service Form 6197, “Gas Guzzler Tax” (revised July 1998).
109 Retail Sales Tax Act, RSO 1990, c. R.31, as amended (herein referred to as “RSTA”), sections 4(5)
and (6). For a brief description of the tax, see Ontario, Ministry of Revenue, Retail Sales Tax Guide
no. 513, June 2001.
110 RSTA section 4.1.
111 Infra notes 170 to 178 and accompanying text.
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As an alternative to taxes on fuel-inefficient automobiles, a number of European
countries levy vehicle registration fees that vary with the fuel efficiency of the
vehicle. In Austria, for example, the rate at which a vehicle registration tax is applied
increases as fuel economy decreases.112 Similarly, in Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden, annual registration fees vary according to the vehicle’s fuel
consumption and environmental characteristics.113 Beginning in March 2001, the
United Kingdom introduced graduated rates for the annual vehicle excise duty
(VED) on private vehicles based on CO2 emissions per kilometre driven.114
Like automobile fuel taxes, motor vehicle taxes and registration fees have traditionally been viewed as benefit taxes or user fees for the public provision of roads
and highways. For this reason, most European countries base motor vehicle registration fees on the weight of the vehicle, its engine size, or the number of axles.115
For the same reason, revenues from the US GGT are dedicated to the Highway Trust
Fund notwithstanding that the tax itself is designed to discourage purchases of
fuel-inefficient vehicles.116 Where rates vary according to fuel efficiency and other
environmental characteristics, however, these taxes and registration fees assume a
clear environmental character.
With respect to the effect of these taxes and registration fees on GHG emissions,
evidence is limited. In Sweden, which introduced differentiated registration fees
for motor vehicles in 1993, reducing fees for cleaner class 1 vehicles and increasing
them for less fuel-efficient class 3 vehicles, the percentage of class 1 and 2 vehicles
increased from 16 to 73 percent between 1993 and 1996—a result that the Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency attributes more to so-called soft effects from
advertising and consumer awareness than from the registration fees themselves.117
Likewise in Germany, where differentiated registration fees were introduced in the
mid-1990s, the number of high-emission vehicles fell from 6.9 million to 3 million
between July 1997 and January 2000, while the number of vehicles meeting highefficiency standards increased from 6.2 million to nearly 16 million during the same

112 This tax is based on the net price of the vehicle, with rates calculated as follows: fuel consumption
in litres per 100 kilometres less 3 (2 for diesel-powered vehicles) times 2 percent. See the
database of environmentally related taxes on the OECD Web site at http://www.oecd.org/.
113 Ibid.
114 The rates for this graduated vehicle excise duty (GVED) are available on the Web site of the
UK Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency at http://www.dvla.gov.uk/vehicles/taxation.htm.
115 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 61.
116 National Center for Environmental Economics, The United States Experience with Economic
Incentives for Protecting the Environment (Washington, DC: National Center for Environmental
Economics, 2001), 49.
117 Sweden, Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Taxes in Sweden (Stockholm:
Environmental Protection Agency, 1997), cited in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD
Countries, supra note 17, at 104-5.
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period.118 In the United States and Ontario, however, the GGT and the TFFC do not
appear to have had a significant impact on the fuel efficiency of new vehicles.119 To
the extent that these taxes fall mostly on a small percentage of fuel-inefficient
vehicles, however, this outcome is not particularly surprising.120 Indeed, Ontario’s
TFFC has been criticized not only on the basis that the rate is essentially flat for
most vehicles, but also for levying lower rates on fuel-inefficient SUVs than on
passenger vehicles and failing to include light trucks and vans, which represent
approximately 25 percent of vehicles sold in the province.121
Another reason that motor vehicle taxes and registration fees appear to have been
more effective in Europe than in North America relates to the combined effect of
these measures and higher automotive fuel taxes, which together discourage purchases of fuel-inefficient vehicles. Here too, therefore, it is important to consider
the environmental effectiveness of motor vehicle taxes not in isolation but together
with other measures to address global warming. Among these other measures, one
of the most promising could be the use of revenues from environmentally differentiated motor vehicle taxes or registration fees to finance tax incentives or other
subsidies to encourage drivers to retire older fuel-inefficient vehicles and to purchase fuel-efficient and clean-energy vehicles.122

Taxes on Energy and Other Fossil Fuels
Although the combustion of automotive fuels constitutes a major source of CO2
emissions in developed countries, a much larger share of these emissions results
from the combustion of other fossil fuels for industrial, commercial, and residential
purposes. In the United States, for example, the transportation sector is estimated
to have accounted for 31 percent of CO2 emissions in 1999, while combustion of fossil
fuels for industrial uses and electricity generation accounted for 35 percent of CO2
emissions, and commercial and residential sectors accounted for 16 and 19 percent

118 H. Jatzke, “The Ecological Reform in Germany,” paper presented at the conference on Green
Tax Reforms in Europe, Paris, October 10, 2000, cited in Environmentally Related Taxes in
OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 104.
119 In the United States, for example, the fuel efficiency of new vehicles has remained largely
unchanged since the early 1980s, shortly after the GGT was introduced. Environmentally
Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 104, figure 13.
120 In Ontario, for example, approximately 90 percent of passenger vehicles fall in the fuelefficiency range that attracts the minimum TFFC of $75. Fair Taxation in a Changing World,
supra note 17, at 567.
121 Ibid., at 566.
122 For Canadian proposals to this effect, see Final Report—Environment and Taxation, supra note 17,
at 10; and Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Alternative Federal Budget 2003, Technical
Paper no. 2, An Action Plan for Kyoto (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, January 27,
2003), 6.
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of CO2 emissions respectively.123 Similarly, in Canada, transportation is estimated
to account for approximately 25 percent of the country’s total GHG emissions.124
For this reason, in order to encourage energy efficiency and reduce GHG emissions from the combustion of other fossil fuels, several countries have introduced
broader taxes on energy consumption and other fossil fuels. In Denmark, for
example, taxes on electricity (most of which is generated by burning coal) and nonautomotive fuel oils were first introduced in 1978.125 In 1988, the Netherlands
introduced a general fuel charge, the revenues from which were earmarked for
environmental expenditures administered by the Ministry of the Environment.126
In the early 1990s, Finland, Norway, and Sweden introduced broad-based fuel taxes
specifically targeting CO 2 emissions,127 and Denmark and the Netherlands restructured their fuel taxes to correspond more closely to the carbon content of different
fuels.128 More recently, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom
have also introduced broad-based taxes on energy consumption and fossil fuels.129
Although neither Canada nor the United States has introduced similar taxes, proposals for broad-based taxes on energy consumption and fossil fuels have been made in
both countries.130
123 U.S. Climate Action Report—2002, supra note 80, at 39-41.
124 Climate Change Plan for Canada, supra note 7, at 20.
125 Hans Larsen, Energy Taxes: The Danish Model (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Taxation,
September 1998).
126 Willem Vermeend and Jacob van der Vaart, Greening Taxes: The Dutch Model (Deventer, the
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1998), 17. See also Hoerner and Bosquet, supra note 17, at 19.
127 For general discussions of these tax reforms, see Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD
Countries, supra note 17, at 51 and 55-56; and Hoerner and Bosquet, supra note 17, at 15-17
(Finland), 22-23 (Norway), and 23-26 (Sweden).
128 For an overview of these reforms in Denmark, see Jens Holger Helbo Hansen, “Green Tax
Reform in Denmark,” in Kai Schlegelmilch, ed., Green Budget Reform in Europe: Countries at the
Forefront (Berlin: Springer, 1999), 51-66. For a detailed explanation of environmental tax reform
in the Netherlands, see Vermeend and van der Vaart, supra note 126. See also Hoerner and
Bosquet, supra note 17, at 11-15 (Denmark) and 19-21 (the Netherlands).
129 See, for example, Barde and Braathen, supra note 17, at paragraphs 41, 42, and 44. See also
Hoerner and Bosquet, supra note 17, at 28-29 (Austria), 17-18 (Germany), 18-19 (Italy), and
26-27 (the United Kingdom).
130 In the United States, for example, the Clinton administration proposed a broad-based energy
tax in February 1993. Although a modified version of the tax was approved by the House of
Representatives in June 1993, the proposal was narrowly defeated in the Senate, which opted to
increase the federal gasoline tax instead. See J. Andrew Hoerner and Frank Muller, Carbon
Taxes for Climate Protection in a Competitive World, paper prepared for the Swiss Federal Office
for Foreign Economic Affairs (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, Center for Global
Change, Environmental Tax Program, June 1996), 9-11. In Canada, both the Ontario Fair Tax
Commission and the federal Technical Committee on Business Taxation recommended that
existing automotive fuel taxes be extended to other fossil fuels, with rates based on the carbon
content of these fuels. See Fair Taxation in a Changing World, supra note 17, at 562; and Report
of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, supra note 17, at 9.14.
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In theory, taxes on energy should help to reduce GHG emissions by decreasing
energy consumption and encouraging greater energy efficiency. From an environmental perspective, however, taxes on fossil fuels are clearly preferable to energy taxes
since they encourage not only increased energy efficiency but also a substitution
away from fossil fuels toward clean and renewable sources of energy. Better still are
taxes based on the carbon content of different fuels, since carbon content is an
excellent proxy for CO2 emissions,131 and such taxes can be expected to encourage both
energy efficiency and the substitution of low-carbon fuels for high-carbon fuels.132
Not surprisingly, therefore, the introduction of taxes based on the carbon content
of different fuels is generally regarded as one of the most cost-effective ways to
stabilize and reduce GHG emissions.133
In general, taxes in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
based mainly on energy consumption, while Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have introduced carbon or CO2 taxes.134 In practice,
however, the distinctions between these taxes are blurred by the fact that many
countries tax both energy and carbon,135 by the availability of energy tax exemptions and rebates for energy from clean and renewable sources,136 and by the
existence of substantial carbon tax rate reductions or rebates for energy-intensive
industries such as manufacturing.137 As a result, most energy taxes contain some
differentiation according to CO 2 emissions from input fuels, while the effective
rates of carbon or CO2 taxes vary only “to some extent . . . according to the carbon

131 See, for example, Donner and Lazar, supra note 17, at 97-98, tables 2 and 3. Coal, for example,
contains the highest amount of carbon and produces the largest CO2 emissions per unit of
energy produced. Petroleum has approximately 25 percent less carbon than coal, while natural
gas has about 45 percent less carbon than coal. U.S. Climate Action Report—2002, supra note 80,
at 38. Although taxes based on the carbon content of different fuels create no incentive to develop
“end-of-pipe” abatement technologies, technological limits on abatement opportunities make
this deficiency more theoretical than real. Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection,
supra note 17, at 57. As technologies for the capture and storage of CO2 become available,
incentives to introduce these technologies could be created by allowing a deduction or credit
against tax otherwise payable.
132 See, for example, Hoerner and Muller, supra note 130, at 3.
133 Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, supra note 17, at 58. See also Roger C. Dower
and Mary Beth Zimmerman, The Right Climate for Carbon Taxes: Creating Economic Incentives To
Protect the Atmosphere (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1992).
134 See the brief descriptions of these taxes in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries,
supra note 17, at 51-52.
135 In Finland, for example, the original carbon tax was amended in the mid-1990s to apply partly
to the energy content and partly to the carbon content of specific fuels. Similarly, Denmark,
the Netherlands, and Sweden levy taxes on both energy use and the carbon content of fuels.
See the database of environmentally related taxes on the OECD Web site at http://www.oecd.org/.
136 See the brief summary of these environmentally motivated exemptions and rebates in
Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 64.
137 See the brief summary of these special provisions ibid., at 56.
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content of those fuels that are taxed.”138 As well, both energy and carbon taxes
include various rate reductions, exemptions, ceilings, and rebates designed to address competitiveness concerns and distributional effects (both regional and among
different income groups).139
With respect to the effectiveness of these taxes in reducing GHG emissions,
estimates vary but are generally positive. According to a study conducted by the
International Energy Agency in 1989, a tax of US $50 per tonne of carbon content
on all fossil fuels was projected to cause coal consumption in OECD countries to
decrease by 25 percent, thermal electricity generation to decrease by 19 percent,
oil consumption to fall by 5 percent, and natural gas consumption to decrease by
4 percent, resulting in reductions of CO 2 emissions of 11.7 percent in the OECD as
a whole and 14.3 percent in North America.140 A subsequent study in Ontario
concluded that a carbon tax of approximately Cdn $25 per tonne of carbon would
reduce CO2 emissions in the province by 4 percent over a 15-year period, with
much larger reductions realized by the industrial sector (8.5 percent) and lower
reductions realized by the commercial, transportation, and residential sectors.141
Studies of proposed energy and carbon taxes in Denmark, Germany, and the
Netherlands projected reductions in CO 2 emissions of 1.5 to 2 percent.142
Although some studies suggest that appreciable reductions in CO2 emissions are
likely only where energy or carbon taxes are levied at very high rates,143 European
experience is more encouraging. In Finland and Sweden, for example, studies
conducted after relatively modest carbon taxes were introduced in the early 1990s
concluded that these taxes resulted in reduced GHG emissions of 7 and 9 percent
respectively.144 Other studies estimating the effects of energy and carbon taxes in
Norway and the Netherlands have also reported meaningful reductions in CO2
emissions.145

138 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
139 See, for example, ibid., at 56, 62-63 (box 10), 78, and 89. For a useful overview of competitiveness
considerations in the design of environmentally related taxes, see ibid., at 71-85. For a brief
discussion of the distributional impact of energy and carbon taxes, see ibid., at 87-89.
140 International Energy Agency, Policy Measures and Their Impact on CO2 Emissions and
Accumulations (Paris: International Energy Agency, 1989).
141 Donner and Lazar, supra note 17, at 128, table 21.
142 See the discussion of the Danish and German studies in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD
Countries, supra note 17, at 105-6; and the discussion of the Dutch study in Vermeend and van
der Vaart, supra note 126, at 45.
143 See, for example, Donner and Lazar, supra note 17.
144 See the discussion of the Finnish study in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries,
supra note 17, at 105; and the discussion of the Swedish study in Environmental Taxes: Recent
Developments, supra note 17, at 46.
145 See the discussion of the Norwegian study in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries,
supra note 17, at 105; and the summary of the Dutch results in Vermeend and van der Vaart, supra
note 126, at 35.
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As with automotive fuel and motor vehicle taxes, it is important to consider the
effectiveness of energy or carbon taxes not in isolation, but together with other
policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions. Where these taxes are combined with
tax incentives or other subsidies for renewable energy sources and energy conservation, for example, the environmental effectiveness of the tax is likely to be greater
and the cost of reducing GHG emissions correspondingly lower.146 Moreover, where
the revenues from these taxes are “recycled” in the form of reductions in other taxes,
competitiveness concerns can be significantly reduced and economic advantages
realized by substituting efficiency-enhancing environmental taxes for distortionary
taxes on labour or capital.147 For these reasons, European countries that have introduced energy or carbon taxes have generally used these revenues to reduce other
taxes and to encourage clean-energy sources and energy efficiency through tax
incentives and other subsidies.148 For the same reasons, Canadian studies advocating
taxes on the carbon content of fuels have generally proposed that revenues be used
to reduce other taxes and provide tax incentives or other subsidies for investments
in energy-efficient equipment and clean and renewable energy.149 To the extent
that a broad-based carbon tax could be expected to impose a heavier burden on
low-income households, which devote a greater percentage of income than highincome households to the consumption of energy, and to regions of the country
such as Alberta that depend more heavily than other regions on fossil fuels, another

146 See, for example, The Carbon Tax To Reduce GHG Emission, supra note 47, cited in
Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 44. See also Hoerner, supra
note 20, at 15-16.
147 For useful discussions of this so-called double dividend hypothesis, see Ernest U. Von Weizsäcker
and Jochen Jesinghaus, Ecological Tax Reform (London: Zed Books, 1992); Lawrence H. Goulder,
“Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader’s Guide” (1995) vol. 2, no. 2
International Tax and Public Finance 157-83; Environmental Taxes and Green Tax Reform, supra
note 17, at 33-36; Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17, at 16-17; and
Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 35-40. Although the magnitude
of any “double dividend” depends on the amount of revenue raised from environmental taxes,
the kinds of taxes subject to rate reductions, the incidence of environmental taxes, and general
equilibrium effects, empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of a carbon-energy tax
with cuts to labour taxes is likely to result in at least some double dividend in the form of
environmental improvements and employment gains. See, for example, A. Majocchi, “Green
Fiscal Reform and Employment: A Survey” (1996) vol. 8, no. 4 Environmental and Resource
Economics 375-97; and Benoît Bosquet, “Environmental Tax Reform: Does It Work? A Survey
of the Empirical Evidence” (2000) vol. 34, no. 1 Ecological Economics 19-32. For this reason, as
Hoerner and Bosquet conclude, comprehensive environmental tax reform, in which revenues
from environmental taxes are used in part to finance reductions in distortionary taxes, “is better
than environmental taxes alone.” Hoerner and Bosquet, supra note 17, at 61.
148 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 27, 39, 61, and 78.
149 See, for example, Fair Taxation in a Changing World, supra note 17, at 562; and Final Report—
Environment and Taxation, supra note 17, at 35.
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important recommendation involves the use of tax revenues to offset undesirable
distributional effects by income class or region.150 The former could be accomplished by reductions in other regressive taxes or increases in transfer payments to
low-income households, while the latter could be accomplished by intergovernmental transfers or reductions in other taxes.

Taxes on Other Sources of GHG Emissions
Although CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels is the leading source of GHG
emissions in OECD countries, other GHGs are significant contributors to global
warming and considerably more potent per unit of emissions.151 Nevertheless,
OECD countries have very little experience with the taxation of non-CO 2 GHGs.152
One reason for this record is undoubtedly the variety of non-CO 2 GHGs and
sources of these emissions, many of which are either unsuitable for taxation or
effectively addressed through regulatory means or voluntary agreements.153 Although
it is technically feasible to substantially reduce methane emissions from the distribution of natural gas, for example, it would be difficult and expensive to measure
emissions over long stretches of pipeline, making taxation impracticable.154 Nor is
it administratively practicable to monitor for tax purposes methane emissions from
old landfills, surface coal mines, and rice cultivation, emissions of methane and
nitrous oxide from manure management, or emissions of hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride in the manufacture of semiconductors.155
Conversely, while taxation may be administratively feasible for methane emissions
from oil and gas production, modern landfills with gas collection facilities, and
underground coal mines, PFC emissions from the production of aluminum, and SF6
emissions from the production of magnesium,156 the limited number of stationary
sites for these emissions may make regulatory measures and voluntary agreements

150 See, for example, Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, supra note 17, at 59; and
Final Report—Environment and Taxation, supra note 17, at 36.
151 In terms of global warming potential (GWP), CH4 is 21 times more potent than CO2, N2O is
310 times more potent, HFCs range from 140 times more potent (HFC-152a) to 11,700 times
more potent (HFC-23), PFCs range from 6,500 times more potent (CF4) to 9,200 times more
potent (C2F6), and SF6 is 23,900 times more potent than CO2. U.S. Climate Action Report—2002,
supra note 80, at 37.
152 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 121.
153 For a detailed analysis of the potential for environmental taxation to reduce non-CO2 GHG
emissions, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Potential for
Using Tax Instruments To Address Non CO2 Greenhouse Gases: CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6
(Paris: OECD, 2000).
154 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 135.
155 Ibid., at 120 and 135.
156 Ibid., at 119 and 134.
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effective alternatives to environmental taxation.157 To the extent that environmental
taxes create a dynamic incentive to go beyond regulatory requirements or voluntary agreements, however, taxes on these emissions or close proxies may be useful
complements to other measures.158
In practice, OECD countries appear to levy only two kinds of taxes related to
non-CO2 GHG emissions: taxes on synthetic fertilizers, the production and application of which release nitrous oxides; and taxes on packaging and solid wastes
deposited at landfills, which are the most significant anthropogenic sources of methane. Although the former are generally regarded as user fees to finance fertilizer
inspection and storage and other agricultural policy measures,159 taxes on fertilizers
also have the potential to reduce N2O emissions by decreasing fertilizer consumption
and production.160 In Austria, for example, a levy on synthetic fertilizers is estimated
to have reduced the demand for nitrogen fertilizer by 2.5 percent.161 In Sweden,
fertilizer taxes are estimated to have reduced aggregate nitrogen dosages by approximately 10 percent.162 Together with environmental regulations, therefore, taxes on
synthetic fertilizers may help to reduce GHG emissions and global warming.
In contrast to taxes on synthetic fertilizers, taxes on packaging and solid wastes
deposited in landfills have an explicit environmental purpose—although this purpose
is not primarily to reduce emissions of CH 4, but to reduce unnecessary packaging
and to encourage individuals and enterprises to recycle and produce less waste.163
To the extent that these taxes reduce the volume of solid waste deposited in landfills,
however, corresponding reductions in CH4 emissions are an inevitable consequence.164 This secondary benefit is likely to be greater where, as in the United
Kingdom, the tax applies at higher rates to CH 4-producing active wastes than to
157 In many OECD countries, in fact, GHG emissions from these sources are subject to regulatory
oversight and/or voluntary agreements. See The Potential for Using Tax Instruments To Address
Non CO2 Greenhouse Gases, supra note 153.
158 See the discussion supra at notes 49 to 54 and accompanying text.
159 Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17, at 48. See also National Center for
Environmental Economics, The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting
the Environment (Washington, DC: National Center for Environmental Economics, 2001), 46.
160 See the discussion in The Potential for Using Tax Instruments To Address Non CO2 Greenhouse Gases,
supra note 153, at 22 (cautioning that taxes on synthetic fertilizers could cause farmers to increase
the use of manure or sewage sludge from wastewater treatment plants, which would increase
emissions of N2O).
161 M.F. Hofreither and F. Sinabell, “The Austrian Levy on Mineral Fertilizers: Selected
Observations,” in L. Gazzola and K. de Roest, eds., Economic Instruments for Nitrogen Control in
European Agriculture (Reggio Emila, Italy: Research Centre on Animal Production, 1999), 67-78,
cited in Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments, supra note 17, at 48.
162 Environmental Taxes in Sweden, supra note 117, cited in Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments,
supra note 17, at 49.
163 For a brief summary of these taxes in OECD countries, see Environmentally Related Taxes in
OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 63-66.
164 The Potential for Using Tax Instruments To Address Non CO2 Greenhouse Gases, supra note 153, at 12.
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inactive wastes that do not result in GHG emissions.165 In Austria, Denmark, and
Norway, waste taxes encourage reductions in CH4 emissions through lower rates
for landfills with energy recovery systems.166 In Norway, the combination of this
waste tax and licensing requirements is projected to reduce CH 4 emissions from
landfills by more than 10 percent per year.167 Here too, therefore, environmental
taxation may complement and enhance other environmental policies such as regulation and voluntary agreements.

Tax Incentives
In addition to environmental taxes, environmental tax incentives may also reduce
global warming by encouraging practices that decrease GHG emissions and enhance
the scope and quality of carbon sinks. The following sections consider tax incentives aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, tax incentives designed to reduce other
GHG emissions, and tax incentives aimed at the preservation and enhancement of
carbon sinks.
Tax Incentives To Reduce CO2 Emissions
The vast majority of CO2 emissions result from the combustion of fossil fuels for
energy.168 Since opportunities for “end-of-pipe” abatement of these emissions are
limited,169 the most effective ways to decrease these emissions involve the efficient
use of energy and the substitution of clean and renewable energy sources for carbonbased fuels. Not surprisingly, therefore, tax incentives aimed at reducing CO2
emissions tend to encourage energy efficiency in various activities and the generation of energy from clean and renewable sources.
Tax Incentives for Fuel-Efficient and Clean-Fuel Vehicles
Among these incentives, some of the most obvious encourage purchases of fuelefficient and clean-fuel vehicles. In the United States, for example, the federal
government introduced a tax credit for “qualified electric vehicles” in 1992, computed at 10 percent of the cost of the vehicle up to a maximum amount of $4,000
and deductible against income tax otherwise payable.170 Another incentive allows a
165 For a description of the UK landfill tax, see, for example, Robert E. Whittall, “Landfill Tax in
the United Kingdom,” available on the Environmental Taxation Worldwide Web site at http://
www.greentaxes.org/country/uk/land.asp.
166 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 65. See also Norway, Ministry
of the Environment, Norway’s Third National Communication Under the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Oslo: Ministry of the Environment, June 2002), 38.
167 Calculated from figures presented in Norway’s Third National Communication Under the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 166, at 41 and 43.
168 See supra note 80.
169 Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, supra note 17, at 57.
170 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, section 30 (herein referred to as “IRC”). For this
purpose, a qualified electric vehicle is defined as a motor vehicle that is powered primarily by
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limited deduction for part of the cost of “clean-fuel vehicles” powered by natural gas,
liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, hydrogen, electricity, and any other fuel
at least 85 percent of which is methanol, ethanol, or any other alcohol or ether.171
In addition to these incentives, which are scheduled to decrease and disappear by
2006, recent proposals would introduce further tax credits for fuel-efficient hybrid
vehicles, vehicles powered by fuel cells, and alternative and mixed-fuel vehicles.172
As well, several US states provide tax incentives for alternative-fuelled vehicles in the
form of credits against income taxes or exemptions from sales taxes.173 In Ontario,
rebates against provincial sales taxes are available for vehicles powered by electricity,
propane, natural gas, or other clean-burning fuels.174 In British Columbia, a partial
refund of provincial sales tax is available for the purchase of an alternative-fuel
vehicle, computed at 30 percent of the tax paid up to $1,000 for a passenger vehicle
and $10,000 for a passenger bus.175
In theory, these incentives should increase sales of fuel-efficient and clean-fuel
vehicles by reducing their after-tax prices relative to those of conventional vehicles.
an electric motor drawing current from rechargeable batteries, fuel cells, or other portable
sources of electrical current.
171 IRC section 179A. The deduction is limited to the portion of the vehicle’s cost that is attributable
to the engine, the fuel tank, the system for delivering fuel to the engine, and the exhaust system,
and is capped at $50,000 for a truck or van with a gross vehicle weight over 26,000 pounds or a
bus with a seating capacity of at least 20 adults, $5,000 in the case of a truck or van with a gross
vehicle weight between 10,000 and 26,000 pounds, and $2,000 in the case of any other vehicle.
Where the vehicle is used in a trade or business, the cost of the vehicle for purposes of
depreciation is reduced by the amount of the deduction.
172 For example, as part of the CCTI (supra note 71), the Clinton administration proposed a credit
against federal income tax for hybrid vehicles purchased between 2003 and 2006, equal to $1,000
for a vehicle that is one-third more fuel efficient than a comparable vehicle in its class, $2,000 for
a vehicle that is two-thirds more fuel efficient than a comparable vehicle in its class, $3,000 for a
vehicle that is twice as fuel efficient as a comparable vehicle in its class, and $4,000 for a vehicle
that is three times more fuel efficient than a comparable vehicle in its class. For a detailed
discussion of this incentive, see J. Andrew Hoerner and Avery P. Gilbert, Assessing Tax Incentives
for Clean Energy Technologies: A Survey of Experts Approach (Washington, DC: Center for a
Sustainable Economy, 2000), 19-31. For more recent proposals, see United States, Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of S. ___ “Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2002,” JCX-2-02
(Washington, DC: Joint Committee on Taxation, February 11, 2002).
173 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 38-39. In Oregon, for example, individuals who purchase an alternativefuel vehicle can obtain a credit against state income tax of up to $1,500, while businesses can
claim a credit against state business tax of 35 percent of the difference between the cost of a
hybrid-electric or other dual-fuel vehicle and the cost of a conventional vehicle of the same class
and size. See Oregon Office of Energy, “Hybrid Electric and Dual-Fuel Vehicles,” available on
the Web at http://www.energy.state.or.us/trans/hybridcr.htm.
174 RSTA sections 48(3)(g) and (h). The amount of the rebate is up to $750 for vehicles powered
by propane and up to $2,000 for vehicles powered by electricity, natural gas, or other cleanburning fuels.
175 British Columbia, Ministry of Provincial Revenue, Consumer Taxation Branch Bulletin no. 085,
“Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Tax Concessions,” August 2000, revised March 2002.
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Moreover, where increased sales facilitate reductions in production costs, the market
for these vehicles might be expected to expand, resulting in a gradual replacement
of conventional vehicles and corresponding reductions in CO2 emissions—provided
that the incentives encourage mainly the substitution of fuel-efficient and cleanfuel vehicles for conventional vehicles, rather than an increase in total vehicle
purchases, and that drivers do not significantly increase the number of kilometres
driven in response to increases in the fuel efficiency of the vehicles they drive.
In practice, the effectiveness of tax incentives for fuel-efficient and clean-fuel
vehicles is likely to depend on the commercial viability of the qualifying vehicles
and the price differential between these vehicles and conventional vehicles, as well
as the amount and form of the incentive. In the case of qualified electric vehicles, for
example, the amount of the US credit appears to have been insufficient to significantly increase sales of a commercially uncertain and expensive technology.176
More promising are tax incentives for hybrid vehicles such as the Toyota Prius and
Honda Insight, which are commercially available but 20 to 25 percent more expensive than conventional vehicles. Although this price differential suggests that tax
incentives would have to be substantial to be effective,177 the combination of a
lesser incentive with increased automotive fuel taxes and taxes on fuel-inefficient
vehicles might also prove effective.178
Finally, with respect to the form of the incentive, an exemption from otherwise
applicable sales or value-added taxes is likely more effective and more equitable
than a deduction or non-refundable credit against income tax, since a deduction or
credit is realized some time after the vehicle is purchased, requires the consumer to
maintain and file receipts, and depends on the consumer’s taxable income. In the
United States, however, the absence of a federal sales or value-added tax makes
such an approach impossible at the federal level.

Tax Incentives for Ride Sharing and Public Transportation
In addition to tax incentives for clean-fuel vehicles and fuel-efficient vehicles,
several jurisdictions provide tax relief for ride sharing or public transportation. In
the United States, for example, the federal income tax exempts employer-provided
vanpooling and transit passes from tax as employment benefits.179 Similar incentives for ride sharing and mass transit exist in several US states, in the form of either
exemptions from income tax as employment benefits or special credits against state

176 Notwithstanding the credit, sales of these vehicles in the United States were only 1,238 in 1998.
Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 21.
177 Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 32 (concluding on this basis
that the CCTI incentive would do little to encourage sales of vehicles that would not otherwise
have occurred, producing windfalls for consumers who would have purchased the qualifying
vehicles without the incentive).
178 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 29.
179 IRC section 132(f ).
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income tax for costs incurred by employers.180 In Canada, Quebec recently announced that it would also exempt employer-provided transit passes from tax and
permit employees who do not receive these passes as employment benefits to deduct
the cost of public transit in computing their incomes for provincial tax purposes.181
Other jurisdictions exempt high-occupancy vehicles and public transportation from
automotive fuel taxes.182
To the extent that current tax rules favour commuting by private vehicle—by
failing to include employer-provided parking as an employment benefit,183 for
example—these measures may be considered necessary to prevent an existing tax
bias in favour of single-occupancy vehicles. More generally, these incentives can be
expected to increase ride sharing and public transit use by reducing the after-tax
cost of these methods of transportation relative to alternatives. Moreover, since
urban commuting is likely to be relatively price inelastic, at least in the short run, one
would expect the use of private vehicles to decrease as commuters shift to ride sharing
and public transit. In Washington State, for example, tax credits for ride sharing and
public transit have increased the use of these methods of transportation and decreased
the number of single-occupancy vehicles on the road, leading the State Energy
Office to conclude that the tax incentives are much more cost-effective than is the
building of more roads.184 More important, perhaps, these incentives have the
potential to change attitudes and habits, resulting in behavioural responses exceeding those predicted by economic analysis alone.185 Together with other policies
such as increased funding for public transit, these measures can help to reduce
GHG emissions from urban commuting as well as road congestion more generally.
With respect to the design of these incentives, it is unclear whether they are best
directed at employers, who determine compensation packages and are well placed
to establish institutional arrangements for ride-sharing programs, or at employees,
who make the ultimate decisions about methods of transportation to and from work.

180 In Wisconsin, employer-provided vanpooling and transit passes are exempt from tax as
employment benefits. Hoerner, supra note 20, at 39. Washington State, on the other hand,
provides a 50 percent income tax credit for costs incurred by employers to establish employee
ride-sharing programs and a 30 percent credit for employer-provided bus passes. Ibid., at 20.
Similarly, in Minnesota, employers may claim a 30 percent credit against state income tax for
the cost of providing vanpools and transit passes to their employees. See the Web site of
Minnesotans for an Energy-Efficient Economy at http://www.me3.org/projects/greentax/.
181 Government of Quebec, 2003-2004 Budget, Additional Information on the Budgetary
Measures, March 11, 2003, 12-14.
182 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 64; and Hoerner, supra note 20,
at 39.
183 The failure to include these benefits in computing an employee’s income appears to be
common to OECD countries. Environmental Taxes and Green Tax Reform, supra note 17, at 19.
184 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 20.
185 Ibid.
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In either event, a tax incentive in the form of an exempt benefit or deduction, as
the government of Quebec proposed in its 2003-4 budget, is open to the criticism
that it is a regressive “upside-down subsidy” worth more to high-income employees than to those with lower incomes. Where commuting expenses are viewed as a
cost of earning income, however, an exempt benefit or deduction may be defended as
a necessary adjustment to the computation of taxable income. In practice, however,
these expenses are typically characterized as discretionary personal expenses rather
than costs of earning income.186

Tax Incentives for Energy-Efficient
Buildings and Equipment
Although transportation accounts for a significant percentage of CO2 emissions in
OECD countries, a substantial share of these emissions is attributable to the heating
and cooling of air and water and the operation of appliances and other equipment
in commercial and residential buildings.187 For this reason, incentives for energyefficient buildings and equipment represent another important category of tax
incentives to reduce global warming.
Like tax incentives for clean-fuel and fuel-efficient vehicles, these incentives
tend to take one of two forms: credits in computing income tax payable, and sales
tax exemptions or rebates. In the Netherlands, for example, a 40 percent tax credit
for investments in energy-saving measures was introduced in 1997.188 In Oregon, a
business energy tax credit provides a 35 percent credit against state business taxes
for investments in approved energy-efficiency investments.189 Montana and Hawaii
offer income tax credits for investments in residential energy conservation, while
Connecticut provides an income tax credit up to 60 percent for investments in
residential energy conservation in units with a high percentage of low-income
households.190 The Clinton administration’s climate change technology initiative

186 See, for example, the decision of the UK Court of Appeal in Newsom v. Robertson (HM Inspector
of Taxes) (1952), 33 TC 452 (CA).
187 In the United States, for example, the commercial and residential sectors are estimated to have
accounted for 35 percent of CO2 emissions (28 percent of GHG emissions) in 1999, slightly
more than the 31 percent attributable to transportation. U.S. Climate Action Report—2002,
supra note 80, at 41. In Canada, commercial and residential buildings are estimated to account
for a smaller percentage of GHG emissions—closer to 10 percent. Climate Change Plan for
Canada, supra note 7, at 13.
188 See Vermeend and van der Vaart, supra note 126, at 63-68.
189 See Hoerner, supra note 20, at 22. Eligible investments must produce “substantial” energy
savings, defined as 50 percent of the energy used to heat water, 10 percent of the energy used
to heat a building, 10 percent of commercial or industrial process load, or 30 percent of a waste
heat stream for heat recovery projects. Applicants must certify that projects satisfy these criteria,
which are subject to audit by the Oregon Department of Energy.
190 Ibid., at 36.
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(CCTI) would have introduced tax credits for purchases of energy-efficient building
equipment and energy-efficient new homes,191 but these have not been approved
by Congress.192 In British Columbia, materials used to improve the energy efficiency
of residential and commercial buildings are exempt from provincial sales tax.193
Similarly, the Ontario government provides a rebate for provincial sales taxes on
purchases of energy-efficient clothes washers, refrigerators, and dishwashers purchased after November 25, 2002 and before November 26, 2003.194 In addition,
the United States allows taxpayers to exclude from income the value of any subsidy
provided by a public utility for the purchase or installation of an energy conservation measure designed to reduce the consumption of electricity or natural gas or to
improve the management of energy demand with respect to a dwelling unit.195
In principle, these tax incentives should increase investments in energy-efficient
buildings and equipment, thereby reducing energy consumption and CO2 emissions.
Moreover, to the extent that owners of buildings either undervalue or fail to fully
capture the economic gains from energy-efficient investments, these incentives
may address a market failure that prevents an efficient level of investment. Such is
often the case, for example, with rental buildings where neither the landlord nor
the tenant obtains the full benefit from energy-efficient investments that one or the
other might make.
In practice, however, the effectiveness of many of these incentives is highly
uncertain.196 Incentives for energy-efficient appliances, for example, may not only
induce consumers to substitute energy-efficient appliances for less efficient appliances, but may also increase total appliance purchases and encourage owners to use
these appliances more intensively (for example, washing clothes more frequently or
running air conditioners longer and at lower temperatures), leading to increased

191 For detailed descriptions and analyses of these proposed tax incentives, see Hoerner and Gilbert,
supra note 172, at 32-56; and Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71,
at 14-22.
192 Some of these proposals appear to have been revived in more recent legislative proposals. See,
for example, Description of S. ___ “Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2002,” supra note 172, at 13-17
(business tax credit for construction of new energy-efficient homes, and tax credit for energyefficient appliances).
193 See Social Service Tax Act (BC), RSBC 1996, c. 431, as amended, section 74(a) and Social
Service Tax Act Regulations, BC Reg. 84/58, as amended, section 3.20, which exempt thermal
insulation material, polystyrene forming blocks used as insulation, storm windows and doors,
multiglazed windows, weather stripping and caulking materials, chemicals used to make spray
polyurethane foam insulation, and specified window-insulating systems.
194 RSTA section 9.1.
195 IRC section 136(c)(1).
196 In the Netherlands, for example, the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis concluded that the
tax credit for investments in energy-saving measures would generate little in the way of energy
savings relative to its cost in terms of forgone revenues. Vermeend and van der Vaart, supra
note 126, at 68.
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energy consumption and GHG emissions.197 However, where the elasticity of demand
for the particular type of appliance is low and more intensive use of an energyefficient appliance is unlikely (as might be the case with a refrigerator), these
incentives are likely to be more effective.
Incentives for energy-efficient new homes have a limited impact on global
warming, owing to the slow turnover of the housing stock, and are probably better
directed at those who build new homes than at purchasers who have little involvement in the key decisions affecting the energy efficiency of new homes.198 As the
number of builders is much smaller than the number of purchasers, however,
improved energy efficiencies might be achieved more effectively through a combination of regulatory requirements, voluntary agreements, and direct subsidies.199
More promising, perhaps, are tax incentives for energy-efficient retrofits, which
could affect a much larger percentage of the building stock200 and encourage
innovative solutions by subsidizing certified efficiency improvements (subject to
audit) without specifying particular methods or technologies.201 Such is the case,
for example, with Oregon’s business energy tax credit, which is reported to have
had a significant effect on energy conservation investments in the state.202 Special
incentives might also be directed at improving energy efficiency in rental units and
low-income households, where market failures and resource limitations make energyefficient investments less likely.
Whether these incentives should take the form of tax expenditures, however, is
much less certain. While tax incentives may be less costly to administer than direct
spending programs, they increase the complexity of the tax system and may be less
effective than a direct grant program, the benefit from which does not depend on
the time of year when tax returns are filed.203 In Canada, energy-efficient retrofits
are currently supported by two federal spending programs: one for commercial

197 Bruce Yandle and Stuart Buck, “Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle” (2002)
vol. 26, no. 1 Harvard Environmental Law Review 117-229, at 209.
198 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 40.
199 In Canada, for example, a commercial building incentive program provides a direct subsidy of
up to $60,000 for buildings that are at least 25 percent more efficient than buildings satisfying
the requirements of the Model National Energy Code for Buildings. For a brief description of
this program, see the FiscallyGreen Web site at http://www.fiscallygreen.ca/experience.html.
200 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 40.
201 For a brief description of an efficiency tax credit along these lines, see Hoerner and Muller,
supra note 130, at 23.
202 See Hoerner, supra note 20, at 22-23 (reporting on an Oregon Department of Energy study
that concluded that half of the investment projects supported by the credit either would not
have occurred without the credit or would have involved more extensive conservation measures
than would have been taken without the credit).
203 I am indebted to Lisa Philipps for this observation.
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and industrial buildings,204 and a recently introduced program for residential buildings.205 On balance, these direct spending programs are probably preferable to a
tax-delivered incentive.

Tax Incentives for Clean and Renewable Energy
A final category of tax incentives aimed at reducing CO2 emissions involves incentives to encourage the generation of energy from clean and renewable sources. In
countries with taxes on energy or electricity, for example, exemptions or rebates
are generally available for energy from clean and renewable sources.206 Likewise, the
use of clean-burning and renewable automotive fuels is encouraged by reductions
or exemptions from otherwise applicable taxes.207 In the United States, the use of
alternative energy sources for motor vehicles is also encouraged by a tax credit for the
sale or use of alcohol as a fuel208 and a current deduction for otherwise depreciable
property used to refuel clean-fuel vehicles and recharge electric vehicles.209
In addition to these incentives, several countries also provide tax incentives for
direct investments in equipment used to generate heat or power from clean and
renewable sources. In the Netherlands, for example, investments in renewable energy are encouraged through tax-exempt green investment funds and accelerated
depreciation for various kinds of environmental investments, including investments
in renewable energy equipment.210 In the United States, a federal income tax credit
for purchases of solar and geothermal energy equipment was introduced in 1978.211
Although the credit for residential uses expired in 1985, a credit for commercial uses

204 Under the energy innovators initiative, the federal government contributes up to 25 percent of
the eligible costs of pilot projects to a maximum of $250,000, provided that the recipient replicates
the energy-efficient measures in at least 25 percent of its remaining facilities. For a brief description
of this program, see the FiscallyGreen Web site at http://www.fiscallygreen.ca/experience.html.
205 Under the energuide for houses program, which came into effect in October 2003,
homeowners may obtain up to $3,348 for retrofits to a principal residence that achieve
stipulated improvements in energy efficiency. For details, see the Office of Energy Efficiency
Web site at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/.
206 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 64.
207 See the discussion supra at notes 94 to 98 and accompanying text.
208 IRC section 40.
209 IRC section 179A.
210 See Vermeend and van der Vaart, supra note 126, at 60-63 (green investment funds) and 52-59
(accelerated depreciation). To qualify as a green investment fund, the fund must devote at least
70 percent of its assets to investments in qualifying green projects defined by legislation. Until
1998, these projects had to be in the Netherlands. Since then, however, qualifying projects may
also be situated in Eastern Europe or developing countries.
211 See the description of this credit in Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 72. As originally
enacted, the tax incentive provided a credit of 30 percent of the first $2,000 investment in
qualifying property and a credit of 20 percent on the next $8,000 spent. In 1980, the credit was
increased to 40 percent on the first $10,000 spent.
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remains,212 and several legislative proposals would both restore a credit for residential
purposes and make the credit available for investments in wind energy equipment
as well as solar and geothermal energy equipment.213 Another US tax incentive
encourages the generation of electricity by wind or closed-loop biomass through a
credit of 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour of electricity generated from these sources.214
Other US legislative proposals include a tax credit for investments in combined
heat and power (CHP) systems,215 and tax credits both for investments in clean coal
technology facilities and for the generation of electricity from these facilities.216 As
well, several US states provide tax incentives for solar power and electricity produced
by wind or biomass, typically in the form of investment tax credits against state
personal or corporate income taxes, but also in the form of sales tax exemptions
and reduced property taxes.217
In Canada, tax incentives for clean and renewable energy take the form of accelerated depreciation for qualifying investments, sales tax exemptions or rebates, and
income and property tax holidays.218 Since the 1970s, for example, the federal

212 IRC section 48. Although 15 percent in 1986 and 12 percent from 1987 to 1991, this credit was
reduced to 10 percent in 1992, where it has remained. See Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172,
at 72-73.
213 The Clinton administration’s CCTI, for example, would have introduced a credit for purchases
of rooftop photovoltaic systems and solar water-heating systems located on or adjacent to a
building for uses other than heating swimming pools, equal to 15 percent of qualifying
investments up to $1,000 for solar water-heating systems and $2,000 for rooftop photovoltaic
systems. For detailed descriptions and evaluations of this proposal, see Hoerner and Gilbert,
supra note 172, at 72-86; and Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71,
at 22-24. A more recent legislative proposal would provide a 15 percent credit for purchases of
rooftop photovoltaic systems and solar water-heating systems and a 30 percent credit for purchases
of wind energy equipment and qualified fuel cell power plants. See Description of S. ___ “Energy
Tax Incentives Act of 2002,” supra note 172, at 17-19.
214 IRC section 45. This credit is indexed for inflation and was 1.7 cents per kilowatt hour in 2001.
For the purpose of this credit, “closed-loop” biomass is defined as “any organic material from a
plant which is planted exclusively for purposes of being used at a qualifying facility to produce
electricity.” For detailed discussions and evaluations of this credit, and of legislative proposals
to extend it to electricity produced by non-closed-loop biomass and the use of biomass in coalfired plants, see Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 86-102; and Analysis of the Climate
Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 36-37, 38-46, and 54-55.
215 The Clinton administration’s CCTI, for example, proposed an investment tax credit of 8 percent
for purchases of qualifying combined heat and power (CHP) systems between 2000 and 2002.
For a detailed description and evaluation of this proposal, see Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172,
at 57-71. A more recent legislative proposal would provide a 10 percent credit for investments in
CHP systems. See Description of S. ___ “Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2002,” supra note 172, at 23-24.
216 Description of S. ___ “Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2002,” supra note 172, at 25-29.
217 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 35.
218 In addition to these tax incentives, the Canadian government provides direct subsidies for clean
and renewable energy through a production incentive of 1.2 cents per kilowatt hour (declining
to 0.8 cents per kilowatt hour) for wind energy, and through the Canadian renewable energy
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government has allowed investments in qualifying solar heating equipment, smallscale hydroelectric generating equipment, and equipment to generate electricity from
wind or biomass to be depreciated at accelerated rates for the purpose of computing
business income.219 More recent amendments also allow accelerated depreciation
for investments in geothermal energy equipment, fuel cell generating equipment,
and equipment used to convert biomass into bio-oil,220 and permit the current
deduction of expenses (such as the clearing of land) that are incurred in the development of clean and renewable energy projects.221 In addition to these income tax
incentives, British Columbia provides a sales tax exemption for purchases of wind,
solar, and small-scale hydroelectric generating equipment,222 while Ontario offers
sales tax rebates for purchases of solar energy systems and building materials that are
incorporated into clean, alternative, or renewable electricity generation facilities.223
Moreover, in December 2002, the Ontario government introduced a 10-year corporate income tax holiday for income from the generation of electricity from clean,
alternative, or renewable sources,224 and a 10-year property tax holiday for assets
used to generate electricity from these sources.225

deployment initiative (REDI), which offers businesses and institutions a financial incentive of
25 percent of the purchase and installation costs of qualified renewable energy systems for
space and water heating and cooling, up to a maximum of $80,000. For brief descriptions of
these programs, see the FiscallyGreen Web site at http://www.fiscallygreen.ca/experience.html.
219 See the descriptions of class 34 and class 43.1 properties in schedule II of the Income Tax
Regulations, CRC 1978, c. 945, as amended, which provide for rates of 50 percent and 30 percent,
respectively, as opposed to the otherwise applicable class 1, 2, or 8 rates of 4 percent, 6 percent,
or 20 percent.
220 See the description of class 43.1 property in schedule II of the Income Tax Regulations.
221 See the definition of “Canadian renewable and conservation expense” (CRCE) in regulation
1219 of the Income Tax Regulations, which is included in calculating the taxpayer’s “Canadian
exploration expense” (CEE) in paragraph 66.1(6)(g.1) of the federal Income Tax Act, RSC 1985,
c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (herein referred to as “ITA”). CEE is fully deductible in computing
income under ITA subsection 66(1) or (3). Unclaimed CRCE can be carried forward indefinitely
for deduction in future taxation years. Alternatively, where a corporation incurring these
expenses enters into a flowthrough share agreement with shareholders, CRCE may be
renounced in favour of the shareholders who may claim the deductions.
222 Social Service Tax Act (BC), supra note 193, section 74(a) and Social Service Tax Act Regulations,
ibid., section 3.20 (exempting wind-powered generating equipment specifically designed to
produce mechanical or electrical energy, solar photovoltaic collector panels, solar thermal
collector panels, and micro-hydroelectric turbines).
223 RSTA sections 48(3)(r) and (q). In the March 27, 2003 Ontario budget, the government
announced its intention to expand this sales tax rebate to include wind energy systems, microhydroelectric systems, and geothermal heating and cooling systems for residential purposes.
224 Corporations Tax Act (Ontario), RSO 1990, c. C.40, as amended, section 13.6.
225 Assessment Act (Ontario), RSO 1990, c. A.31, as amended, section 3.1. As property taxes fall
within the jurisdiction of municipal governments, the government indicated that it would
compensate municipalities for lost property tax revenues.
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While reductions or exemptions from energy or automotive fuel taxes aim to
create indirect incentives for investments in clean and renewable sources of energy
by increasing the demand for alternatives to fossil fuels, tax credits, accelerated
depreciation, and sales and property tax exemptions or rebates for clean and renewable energy equipment are intended to create direct incentives for these investments
by lowering the after-tax cost of the property used to generate this energy. Production tax credits, tax-exempt investment funds, and income tax holidays are meant
to encourage investments in clean and renewable energy by lowering the pre-tax
rate of return necessary to invest in these projects, thereby increasing the supply of
investment capital.
Evidence on the effectiveness of these incentives is limited and mixed. In the
United States, tax credits for solar energy equipment helped to create a significant
increase in the market for these systems in the late 1970s and early 1980s, though
many turned out to be “poorly designed, poorly built and poorly installed,” resulting in high failure rates and a negative reputation.226 With the expiration of credits
for residential use in 1985 and decreases in fuel prices in the latter half of the
1980s, the US market for these systems collapsed and has yet to recover.227 Although
the cost of solar photovoltaic systems has come down in the 1990s,228 they remain
significantly more costly than other forms of energy, making it unlikely that existing
and proposed tax credits will have much impact on overall demand.229 In contrast,
solar water-heating systems can be economically competitive with conventional
alternatives over the life of the system, making tax incentives a useful way to offset
the high initial cost of these systems and encourage lower costs through economies
of scale.230 Likewise, incentives for wind generation appear to have been relatively
successful, encouraging substantial investments in wind turbines,231 which have caused
prices to fall as output has expanded.232 Incentives for biomass energy and CHP

226 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 73.
227 Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 23.
228 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 76.
229 Ibid., at 85. See also Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 24
(concluding that the proposed CCTI incentive would make solar technologies economically
attractive only in “[n]iche markets with local incentives in place and electricity rates much
higher than the national average”).
230 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 74.
231 In the Netherlands, for example, over 350 wind turbines were supported by green investment
funds between 1995 and 1998. Vermeend and van der Vaart, supra note 126, at 62-63. In the
United States, the production tax credit for wind energy is credited with the establishment of
new wind-generating facilities in Texas, Minnesota, Wyoming, and Colorado. Hoerner and
Gilbert, supra note 172, at 89.
232 See, for example, Frank Muller, “Tax Credits and the Development of Renewable Energy in
California,” in Robert Gale and Stephen Barg, eds., Green Budget Reform: An International
Casebook of Leading Practices (London: Earthscan Publications, 1995), chapter 2. See also
Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 88-90 (concluding that the combination of these price
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systems, on the other hand, seem less promising, as the former is significantly more
costly than conventional sources,233 while the primary impediment to the latter
appears to involve regulatory barriers to third-party generation and sale of power.234
At the same time, it is important to recognize that incentives for clean and renewable energy are likely to be most effective when combined with environmental
taxes and other environmental measures that also encourage these alternatives.235
With respect to the form of these tax incentives, the optimal approach presumably depends on the kinds of activities intended to be encouraged. For residential
purchasers of solar energy and heating equipment, sales and value-added tax exemptions are likely to be more effective and more equitable than income tax credits
or deductions that do not reduce the immediate out-of-pocket cost of the equipment and (except for refundable tax credits) depend on the purchaser’s level of
income. For business investments in clean and renewable energy generation, tax
credits and accelerated depreciation are likely to be more effective, although equity
and administrative simplicity suggest that these incentives be delivered in the form
of refundable tax credits. Refundable credits do not vary with the investor’s level of
income and do not encourage elaborate ownership structures and transactions in
order to ensure that non-refundable credits and deductions can be claimed in the
taxation years in which they are available.236 Similarly, financing incentives may be
a useful way to encourage capital investments in clean and renewable energy, but
are inequitable when delivered in the form of tax-exempt investments and income
tax holidays, which are worth more to high-income taxpayers than to taxpayers
with little or no income.237 Somewhat more equitable is a recent Canadian proposal for tax-assisted environmental organization capital investment funds, which
would be required to invest in qualifying environmental investments, although this
proposal contemplates a non-refundable credit rather than a refundable credit.238
decreases and the US production tax credit could make wind energy competitive with energy
from fossil fuels by 2005).
233 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 91 (adding that investments in biomass plants involve
a greater commitment of capital, and therefore greater risk, than investments in solar or wind
facilities, and that the expansion of biomass energy requires a reliable and economically viable
source of biomass, which is unlikely to develop without established markets for this biomass).
Where biomass is used in coal-fired plants, on the other hand, cost considerations suggest that
tax incentives may be more effective. See ibid., at 93; and Analysis of the Climate Change
Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 44.
234 Hoerner and Gilbert, supra note 172, at 68-70.
235 See, for example, Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 45 (noting
that new wind plants appear to have been encouraged by the combination of federal tax
incentives, state mandates, and other incentive programs).
236 See Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, supra note 17, at 60-63.
237 Ibid., at 64-65.
238 See “Proposal for the Creation of Environmental Organization Capital Investment Funds—
Introduction,” on the AlkalizeForHealth Web site at http://www.alkalizeforhealth.net/eocif/
introduction.htm.
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Tax Incentives To Reduce Non-CO2 GHG Emissions
In addition to incentives to reduce CO2 emissions, tax incentives can also be used to
encourage reductions in non-CO2 GHG emissions. In the United States, for example, the use of landfill CH 4 to generate electricity is encouraged by a production tax
credit of 1.0 cent per kilowatt hour.239 In Canada, equipment used to collect landfill
gas became eligible for accelerated depreciation in 1994.240 The Clinton administration’s CCTI proposed to introduce a 10 percent tax credit for the installation of
new power circuit-breaker equipment to replace power circuit breakers that are
prone to leak SF6, and a 10 percent tax credit for the installation of HFC and PFC
recovery/recycling equipment in semiconductor manufacturing plants, though neither
was enacted.241 Other tax incentives might be imagined to encourage the capture of
CH 4 for storage or energy generation from oil and natural gas production and coal
mining, reduced CH4 emissions from natural gas pipelines, reduced CH4 and N2O
emissions from manure management, reduced PFC emissions from the production
of aluminum, and reduced SF6 emissions from the production of magnesium.
Although some of these tax incentives might encourage reductions in non-CO2
GHG emissions, many of these emissions are either difficult to monitor or effectively addressed through regulatory approaches or voluntary agreements.242 In the
United States, for example, increases in electricity generation from landfill gas are
attributable primarily to state regulatory mandates, such that the majority of the tax
benefits from the federal production tax incentives are expected to flow to landfills
that would have installed energy-generating systems even without the credit.243 For
this reason, the rationale for tax incentives in this context may be less to encourage
environmentally sensitive behaviour than to share the cost of new emission reduction measures established by regulation or voluntary agreement. Given the limited
number of stationary sites for these emissions, however, direct subsidies may be a
more transparent and effective method of cost sharing in these settings than tax
incentives.

Tax Incentives To Preserve and Enhance Carbon Sinks
A final strategy to reduce global warming involves the preservation and enhancement of carbon sinks, the most important of which are forests and agricultural

239 For detailed descriptions and analysis of this incentive, and the CCTI proposal to extend it to
landfill gas-to-energy projects placed in service between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2005,
see Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 37-38 and 46-47.
240 See the description of class 43.1 property in schedule II of the Income Tax Regulations.
241 For brief descriptions of these proposed credits, see Edwards et al., supra note 41, at 474-75. In
order to qualify for the first credit, the proposal stipulated that the replaced circuit-breaker
equipment would have to be destroyed to prevent further use. In order to qualify for the
second credit, the proposal required the equipment to recover 99 percent of HFCs and PFCs.
242 See the discussion supra at notes 153 to 158 and accompanying text.
243 Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative, supra note 71, at 46-47.
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soils.244 Together with tax incentives to reduce GHG emissions, many jurisdictions
provide tax incentives to maintain or expand forests and agricultural soils. In the
United States, for example, several states encourage the preservation of forest and
agricultural property through property tax assessments based on current use rather
than market value.245 In Maine and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia,
Ontario, and Quebec, property tax reductions are available only for woodlots that
are managed in accordance with environmental criteria.246 The Canadian government also encourages the preservation of forests and agricultural land through
special rules permitting tax-deferred transfers of farm property and commercial
woodlots operated in accordance with a prescribed forest management plan.247 In
addition to these rules, the preservation of ecologically sensitive land is encouraged
by a special tax incentive for charitable donations of this property.248 Reforestation
is also encouraged in the United States through tax credits249 and in Ontario
through the exemption of tree seedlings from provincial sales tax.250 Other proposals
include income tax incentives for environmentally sensitive forest-harvesting equipment and practices,251 reduced sales taxes on forest products certified to have come
from a forest subject to a certified environmentally sensitive forest management

244 See supra notes 3 and 84 and accompanying text.
245 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 39.
246 See, for example, ibid., at 23 (Maine); and Nathalie Chalifour, “Ecological Fiscal Reform and
the WTO—An Analysis of the Limitations of the Canadian Government To Implement EFR
Relating to Forests,” paper presented at the Third Annual Global Conference on Environmental
Taxation: Issues, Experience and Potential, Woodstock, Vermont, April 12-13, 2002, 17-18
(British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec).
247 ITA subsections 70(9) (testamentary transfer) and 73(3) (inter vivos transfer). As a general rule,
capital property transferred at death or by inter vivos gift is subject to a deemed disposition at
fair market value. ITA subsections 69(1) (inter vivos gift) and 70(5) (transfer at death).
248 See ITA paragraph 38(a.2), which reduces the taxable capital gain on gifts of ecologically
sensitive land from the generally applicable inclusion rate of one-half to one-quarter. Although
accrued capital gains on gifts of this property are partly taxable, the charitable contributions
deduction (for corporations) or credit (for individuals) that may be claimed on the gift is based
on the fair market value of the property.
249 IRC sections 194 and 48(b). For a brief discussion of this tax incentive, see Roberta Mann,
“Waiting To Exhale? Global Warming and Tax Policy” (2002) vol. 51, no. 6 American University
Law Review 1135-1222, at 1193-94. In addition to this federal credit, the state of North Carolina
also provides an income tax credit for reforestation. See Hoerner, supra note 20, at 40.
250 See RSTA section 7(1)13 and Revised Regulations of Ontario 1990, regulations 1012 and 1013,
as amended.
251 See, for example, Chalifour, supra note 246, at 13-16 (proposing accelerated depreciation for
environmentally sensitive forest-harvesting equipment, a tax credit for research and development
carried out in order to modify forest management practices in order to satisfy environmental
certification standards, and a tax credit for the cost of hiring new staff to use environmentally
sensitive forestry equipment).
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plan,252 and a carbon sequestration tax credit based on the annual quantity of carbon
sequestered by new projects.253
Evidence on the effectiveness of these tax incentives in reducing global warming is extremely limited. According to one study, however, incentives to encourage
the preservation of forest and agricultural properties are unlikely to have much
impact absent other measures such as zoning regulations.254 Nor are these incentives
likely to enhance the capacity of these carbon sinks unless they are contingent on
owners’ employing environmentally sound forest and soil management practices.255
Provided that the satisfaction of environmental standards is a condition of the
incentive, however, some of these measures may be useful ways to encourage and
share the cost of carbon sequestration. Particularly promising are proposals for a
carbon sequestration tax credit, which could encourage innovative strategies for
the preservation and enhancement of carbon sinks. As with incentives for energyefficient retrofits to commercial and residential buildings, however, direct grants are
likely to be less complex, more effective, and better monitored than tax incentives.

T A X P O L I C Y A N D C A N A D A’ S C L I M A T E
CHANGE ACTION PLAN
As explained in the introduction to this article, Canada’s climate change action plan
(CCAP) proposes actions in several areas in order to achieve targeted reductions of
240 MT of CO 2 equivalent emissions by the end of this decade. Building on the
survey of tax measures to reduce global warming presented in the third part of this
article, the following sections review each of the areas for which action is proposed
under the CCAP, summarizing the actions that are proposed and discussing the
potential role that environmental taxes and tax incentives can play in each area.
Transportation
Beginning with the transportation sector, which accounts for approximately 25 percent of Canada’s GHG emissions,256 the CCAP proposes to reduce emissions by 21 MT
through (1) increased use of ethanol-blended gasoline and biodiesel fuel; (2) negotiated improvements in new vehicle fuel efficiency and public information programs
to promote fuel-efficient vehicles; (3) research and development of fuel cell vehicles
and other fuel cell and hydrogen technologies; (4) public information programs and
voluntary agreements with manufacturers to reduce emissions from and improve
the fuel efficiency of off-road diesel-fuelled commercial equipment such as construction and logging equipment, and gasoline-powered consumer products such

252 Ibid., at 18-19.
253 See, for example, Mann, supra note 249, at 1214-15.
254 Hoerner, supra note 20, at 40.
255 Ibid., at 23.
256 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 20.
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as outboard motors and snowmobiles; (5) investments in public transportation; and
(6) public-private collaboration to improve efficiencies in goods transportation.257
With respect to automotive fuels, the CCAP itself mentions the role that tax
exemptions can play to encourage the use of clean and renewable fuels.258 In addition, US experience suggests that increased use of clean-burning fuels can also be
encouraged by tax incentives directed at the production and distribution of these
fuels.259 As well, higher automotive fuel taxes are apt to encourage increased use of
clean and renewable fuels as the price differential between taxed and untaxed fuels
increases. In practice, however, Canada’s ability to increase automotive fuel taxes is
significantly constrained by combined federal and state taxes in key border states in
the United States, which are currently about 40 percent less than Canadian rates.260
As a practical policy to help achieve Canada’s commitments under the Kyoto protocol, therefore, increases in Canadian automotive fuel taxes depend on corresponding
action in the United States.
Regarding vehicle efficiency and alternative-fuel vehicles, the CCAP proposes
negotiated agreements with manufacturers, public information programs, and federal funding for research and development.261 In addition to these measures, excise
taxes and/or annual registration fees on fuel-inefficient vehicles, tax incentives for
fuel-efficient and clean-fuel vehicles, and financial incentives to retire older fuelinefficient vehicles represent potentially effective market-based instruments to
improve the fuel efficiency of the motor vehicle stock in Canada.262 Tax incentives
can also help to improve efficiencies in goods transportation, at least where this
requires investments in new equipment such as anti-idling systems for rail and truck
services, on-board tire inflation technologies, and aerodynamic drag reducers.263
In practice, annual registration fees that are differentiated according to the fuel
efficiency of different vehicles appear to have had a greater impact on the fuel efficiency of newly acquired vehicles than up-front excise taxes, although this result
likely depends on the design of existing taxes in Ontario and the United States, and
on the combined effect of differentiated registration fees in European countries
and considerably higher taxes on automotive fuels.264 With respect to incentives to

257 Ibid., at 20-24.
258 Ibid., at 23 (mentioning the Ontario fuel tax exemption for biodiesel).
259 See the discussion of the US tax credit for the sale of use of alcohol as a fuel and the current
deduction for otherwise depreciable property used to refuel clean-fuel vehicles, supra at notes 208
to 209 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 88 to 91 and accompanying text.
261 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 21-22.
262 See the discussion of taxes, registration fees, and tax incentives supra at notes 107 to 122 and
170 to 178 and accompanying text.
263 See Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 24.
264 See the discussion of registration fees and excise taxes supra at notes 117 to 122 and
accompanying text.
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purchase fuel-efficient and clean-fuel vehicles, sales and value-added tax exemptions
are likely more effective than income tax incentives and are probably best targeted at
commercially viable vehicles with a cost that is currently somewhat higher than that
of less fuel-efficient vehicles.265 Financial incentives to retire older fuel-inefficient
vehicles, on the other hand, are probably best delivered in the form of direct grants
rather than tax expenditures, the benefit from which depends on the filing of a tax
return.
In addition to these measures, environmental taxes and tax incentives may also
contribute to the CCAP’s other proposals for the transportation sector. Where
purchases of gasoline and diesel fuel for off-road uses are not subject to sales and
excise taxes,266 taxation of these fuels would contribute to increased fuel efficiency
and reduced emissions. As well, tax incentives to use public transportation can
complement federal funding for basic infrastructure.267 Moreover, to the extent that
employer-provided parking is not effectively taxed as an employment benefit, tax
incentives such as those for employer-provided vanpooling and transit passes can
help to correct an existing tax distortion in favour of commuting by private vehicle.

Housing and Commercial/Institutional Buildings
For residential and commercial/institutional buildings, which generated direct
emissions of approximately 77 MT in 2000 and a further 57 MT from the consumption of electricity generated from coal, oil, or natural gas,268 the CCAP proposes to
reduce GHG emissions by 8 MT through (1) energy-efficient retrofits for 20 percent
of Canada’s residential and commercial/institutional building stock by 2010; (2)
increased energy efficiency for all new housing and commercial/institutional buildings built by 2010; and (3) improved standards for equipment and appliances.269
Although consultation with the building industry and building owners is mentioned as one way to achieve this target,270 other measures include existing financial
incentives for commercial and institutional buildings,271 unspecified “actions to
promote wider penetration of energy efficient construction practices and products
in the building community and their adoption on the market,”272 and the possibility of financial incentives for residential retrofits.273
265 See the discussion supra at notes 176 to 178 and accompanying text.
266 In Ontario, for example, gasoline that is used by persons engaged in the business of farming or
fishing may be exempt from gasoline tax and retail sales tax. See, for example, RSTA section 7(1)4.
267 See the discussion of these incentives supra at notes 179 to 186 and accompanying text.
268 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 25.
269 Ibid., at 25-27.
270 Ibid., at 26-27.
271 Ibid. See the brief discussions of the commercial building incentive program and the energy
innovators initiative supra at notes 199 and 204.
272 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 26.
273 Ibid.

2112

■

canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne

(2003) vol. 51, n o 6

On balance, direct spending programs for energy-efficient retrofits are likely to
be more effective and less complicated than tax incentives for this purpose. Tax
incentives are not an optimal way to encourage energy efficiency in new buildings,
since measures for this purpose are probably best directed at builders rather than
purchasers; for purchasers, regulatory requirements, voluntary agreements, and
direct subsidies are likely to be more effective and less complicated than tax expenditures.274 Nor are tax incentives for energy-efficient appliances likely to have a
significant impact on reductions in GHG emissions, since these are apt to increase
the demand for these appliances, as well as the intensity of their use.275 On the
other hand, commercially viable technologies for clean-energy generation such as
solar and geothermal heating and cooling might be encouraged by tax incentives in
the form of exemptions from federal and provincial sales and value-added taxes.
In addition to these measures, further encouragement for energy-efficient buildings could be created by the adoption of a broad-based energy or carbon tax such
as those introduced in many European countries, which would create a continuing
incentive to improve energy efficiency beyond standards embodied in regulations
or grant programs.276 Although the prospect of these taxes can generate concerns
about effects on competitiveness and the distributional impact on low-income
households,277 the impact on aggregate living expenses and total business costs is
likely to be small and can be offset by the recycling of revenues to industries and
income groups that are adversely affected through tax reductions, subsidies for
energy-efficient retrofits, and support to low-income households in the form of
social assistance and/or refundable tax credits.278

Large Industrial Emitters (Including Renewable
Energy and Cleaner Fossil Fuels)
Large industrial emitters, comprising the electricity sector, the oil and gas industry,
mining, and manufacturing, are expected to account for approximately half of
Canada’s GHG emissions by 2010.279 In order to reduce these emissions by 96 MT,
the CCAP contemplates (1) “targets for emissions reductions established through
covenants with a regulatory or financial backstop”; (2) an emissions trading regime,
with access to domestic offsets and international permits to provide flexibility; and

274 See the discussion supra at notes 198 to 199 and accompanying text.
275 See the discussion supra at notes 196 to 197 and accompanying text.
276 See the discussion supra at notes 125 to 150 and accompanying text.
277 See the discussion of these issues in Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra
note 17, at 71 to 85 (competitiveness) and 87 to 89 (distributional impact).
278 At the federal level, for example, the GST credit could be decreased to offset the increased
burden of a tax on energy consumption or fossil fuels.
279 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 28.
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(3) “complementary measures,” including financial incentives and cost-shared investments in clean and renewable energy.280 According to the CCAP, a “large proportion”
of emissions permits “would be provided free to companies, based on their level of
production and an emissions intensity factor.”281 The “complementary measures”
identified by the plan include an existing incentive for wind power production,282
consumer information to encourage the consumption of “green power,”283 cooperation with provincial governments to reduce barriers to interprovincial trade and
transmission of electricity,284 and cost-shared investments in clean coal technology
and other technologies to capture and store CO2 emissions before they are released
into the atmosphere.285
Although the CCAP does not identify the kind of “financial backstop” that might
support voluntary agreements by large industrial emitters to reduce GHG emissions, a broad-based energy or carbon tax could serve this function well.286 Indeed,
the United Kingdom and Denmark combine voluntary agreements with energy
and carbon taxes by reducing taxes on energy-intensive firms that have entered
into negotiated agreements to reduce energy consumption or GHG emissions.287
Moreover, to the extent that emissions permits are distributed free of charge, a
broad-based energy or carbon tax could, like the US tax on ozone-depleting substances, reduce the windfall gains of those receiving these permits.288 Alternatively,
a carbon tax applied only to emissions that exceed levels that are authorized by
permit could function as an effective ceiling on the domestic price of tradable
permits, since firms could be expected to pay the tax where the cost of permits
exceeds the tax and purchase permits whenever the cost of permits is less than the
tax.289 While competitiveness concerns could be significant for some large emitters,
these concerns could be addressed in part by border tax adjustments,290 and also by

280 Ibid., at 30.
281 Ibid. Although the document does not specify the manner in which an emissions intensity factor
would be defined, it presents as possible options “actual performance in a defined period or a
technical and economic assessment of emissions reductions possibilities for the sector.” Ibid.
282 Ibid., at 34. For a brief discussion of this incentive, see supra note 218.
283 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 34.
284 Ibid., at 35.
285 Ibid., at 35-36.
286 See the discussion supra at note 54 and accompanying text.
287 Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries, supra note 17, at 41.
288 See the discussion supra at note 45 and accompanying text.
289 See the discussion supra at note 46 and accompanying text.
290 For an excellent discussion of the use of border tax adjustments in environmental taxation, see
Hoerner and Muller, supra note 130. See also J. Andrew Hoerner, “The Role of Border Tax
Adjustments in Environmental Taxation: Theory and U.S. Experience,” paper presented at the
International Workshop on Market Based Instruments and International Trade of the Institute
for Environmental Studies, Amsterdam, March 19, 1998.
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revenue recycling in the form of reductions to other taxes and tax incentives or
other subsidies for efficiency improvements and clean and renewable energy.291
Concerns about the regional distribution of such a tax could also be addressed by
revenue recycling.
In addition to a broad-based tax on energy consumption or the carbon content
of fossil fuels, tax incentives for energy efficiency and clean and renewable energy
could also contribute to the CCAP’s targeted emission reductions for large industrial emitters. In the oil and gas, mining, and manufacturing sectors, for example,
refundable tax credits for demonstrated improvements in energy efficiency could
help to encourage and offset the cost of targeted emission reductions. In the
electricity sector, generation from clean and renewable sources is currently encouraged by accelerated depreciation, sales tax exemptions and rebates, and income and
property tax holidays;292 however, a more equitable and efficient approach may be
the use of refundable tax credits to reduce the cost of investments in qualifying
equipment and production tax credits to reduce the cost of the resulting “green
power” relative to electricity generated by fossil fuels.

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Fugitive Emissions
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) engaged in general manufacturing
(such as textiles, wood products, food and beverage, and electronics) account for 2
to 3 percent of Canada’s GHG emissions,293 while fugitive emissions from the exploration for and production of oil and natural gas, coal mining, and the distribution of
natural gas are responsible for 7 percent of these emissions.294 Although these emissions will not be subject to the emissions trading system contemplated for large
industrial emitters,295 the CCAP anticipates approximately 3 MT of reductions by
SMEs and 4 MT of reductions in fugitive emissions.296 Emission reductions by SMEs
are to be achieved by voluntary energy-efficiency targets, cost-shared audits, and
sectoral bench-marking and best practices under the Canadian industry program for
energy conservation, as well as technical and financial assistance under the industrial
research assistance program,297 the aims of which are to encourage “thousands of
discrete investments in new capital, . . . switching fuel, and programs of continuous

291 See, for example, Final Report—Environment and Taxation, supra note 17, at 35-36.
292 See supra notes 218 to 225 and accompanying text.
293 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 37 (reporting that SMEs account for about 5 percent
of industrial emissions, which are approximately 50 percent of all GHG emissions).
294 Ibid., at 38.
295 According to the CCAP, emissions trading is inappropriate for SMEs “given the diverse nature
and small size of firms” and impracticable for fugitive emissions “because of difficulties with
precise measurement.” Ibid., at 37.
296 Ibid., at 37-38.
297 Ibid., at 38.
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improvement in their operations.”298 Reductions in fugitive emissions are to be
achieved through “information, demonstrations, regulations and guidelines.”299
In addition to these measures, environmental taxes and tax incentives could help
to reduce GHG emissions. A broad-based energy or carbon tax, for example, would
create an additional financial incentive for SMEs to conserve energy, the revenues
from which could be recycled in the form of lower income or payroll taxes and tax
incentives or other subsidies for energy-efficiency improvements. A carbon tax would
create incentives both to conserve energy and to switch from fossil fuels to clean
and renewable sources of energy. Fugitive emissions, on the other hand, are probably
more amenable to regulatory and voluntary approaches than are environmental
taxation and tax incentives,300 although tax incentives or direct subsidies might be
used to share the cost of emission reductions and/or to encourage the use of these
emissions to generate power.

Agriculture, Forestry, and Landfills
The final sources of GHG emissions in Canada are agriculture, which is responsible
for roughly 60 MT of emissions (CH 4 and N2O), and landfills, which emit approximately 24 MT of emissions (primarily CH 4).301 Forests and agricultural soils, on the
other hand, are projected to provide a carbon sink of 30 MT under current management practices.302 From actions already underway, the CCAP anticipates additional
carbon sequestration of 5.8 MT, and GHG reductions of 2.2 MT from the capture
and flaring or use of CH 4 from landfills.303 Further actions are expected to increase
the volume of forest and agricultural sinks and reduce CH 4 emissions from landfills
by an additional 8 MT.304 Existing and proposed measures to achieve these results
include (1) information programs to “encourage more planting of trees around farms
to absorb carbon dioxide and reduce wind erosion of soil,” to “promote climatefriendly practices that improve soil nutrients, soil and livestock management,” and
to “promote sustainable land use and expand the area covered by perennial forage
and trees”; (2) public investments in science and technology to develop loweremission technologies and strategies for enhancing carbon sinks; (3) a framework
whereby carbon sinks can be sold as offsets within a domestic emissions trading
system; and (4) public funding for municipal projects to capture and flare or use
CH 4 emissions from landfills.305

298 Ibid., at 37.
299 Ibid., at 38.
300 See the discussion supra at notes 153 to 158 and 242 to 243 and accompanying text.
301 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 39.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid., at 40-41.
305 Ibid., at 39-41.
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While informational programs, voluntary agreements, and regulatory measures
are probably the most effective way to reduce GHG emissions from agriculture and
landfills, environmental taxes and tax incentives may also help to reduce these
emissions. Taxes on synthetic fertilizers, for example, may help to reduce emissions
of N2O from the production and use of these fertilizers.306 Taxes on packaging and
solid wastes are likely to reduce CH 4-generating solid wastes, particularly where
they distinguish between active and inactive wastes that do not produce CH 4.307 At
the same time, the capture and use of CH 4 might be encouraged by reduced waste
tax rates for landfills with energy recovery systems308 and tax incentives like the US
production tax credit for electricity generated by landfill CH 4.309 In practice, however, the latter incentive is probably less effective than regulatory measures.
The preservation and enhancement of carbon sinks might also be encouraged
by the use of environmental tax incentives, such as property tax reductions for
forest and agricultural properties that are managed in accordance with environmental criteria, although these incentives are also likely to be less effective than
regulatory requirements. In addition to these and other tax incentives to preserve
forest and agricultural properties, such as those for transfers and gifts of these
properties under the federal ITA,310 tax incentives can also be used to encourage
reforestation.311 Perhaps most interesting are US proposals for a carbon sequestration
tax credit, which, together with a system of tradable offsets in a domestic emissions
trading system, could create a valuable set of financial incentives to preserve and
enhance carbon sinks.312

International Emission Reductions
Under the Kyoto protocol, parties may satisfy their commitments not only by
reducing domestic emissions and enhancing domestic carbon sinks, but also
through investments in emission reductions or sinks in developing countries that
have ratified the protocol (the clean development mechanism), investments in
emission reductions or sinks in other industrialized countries (joint implementation), and the acquisition of “emission reduction units” from other parties through
international emissions trading (IET). Although the CCAP expects to achieve most
of Canada’s emission reduction target through domestic measures, it also anticipates credits of at least 2 MT through participation in international investments

306 See the discussion supra at notes 159 to 162 and accompanying text.
307 See the discussion supra at notes 164 to 165 and accompanying text.
308 See the discussion supra at notes 166 to 167 and accompanying text.
309 See the discussion supra at note 239 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 247 to 248 and accompanying text.
311 See the description of income and sales tax incentives supra at notes 249 to 250 and
accompanying text.
312 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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and the acquisition of at least 10 MT through IET.313 For these purposes, the CCAP
proposes to consult with the private sector on “the best approach to work together
in support of their investments and purchases on the international market.”314
The purchase and sale of emissions permits through IET has important tax
implications that should be addressed as part of this consultation.315 More important in the context of this article, the availability of emissions credits through
international investments suggests that tax incentives to reduce GHG emissions or
enhance carbon sinks should be available not only for investments in Canada, but
also for qualifying investments under the clean development mechanism or joint
implementation.

CONCLUSION
Environmental taxes and tax incentives are not a panacea to address the problem of
global warming. As this article has attempted to demonstrate, however, they are
important policy instruments that should be considered along with other environmental measures in any strategy to reduce global warming. In addition to promoting
economic efficiency and justice, environmental taxes can also play an educational
and transformative role, encouraging environmental awareness and a shared sense
of environmental responsibility. These objectives can also justify environmental tax
incentives, although these should properly be regarded as tax expenditures and
subject to the same scrutiny as other public spending programs. Moreover, as a
general rule, environmental taxes and tax incentives should be regarded as complements to other environmental policies, interacting with environmental regulations,
voluntary agreements, tradable permits, informational campaigns, direct subsidies,
and the earmarking of revenues for environmental purposes.
Among environmental taxes to reduce global warming, the most promising
involves the extension of automotive fuel taxes to other fossil fuels, with different
rates based on the carbon content of these fuels. Together with other environmental
policies, a broad-based carbon tax along these lines would create a continuing incentive to improve energy efficiency and to substitute clean and renewable sources of
energy for those most responsible for global warming. Other environmental taxes
meriting serious consideration include differential motor vehicle excise taxes and/
or annual registration fees based on fuel-efficiency ratings, environmental taxes on
synthetic fertilizers, and taxes on the disposal of organic solid waste.
With respect to environmental tax incentives to reduce global warming, the
most promising are sales and value-added tax exemptions for commercially viable
fuel-efficient and clean-fuel vehicles, credits or exemptions for employer-provided

313 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 7, at 42.
314 Ibid.
315 Key questions involve the characterization of these permits for the purpose of determining
allowable deductions and gains or losses on their disposition.
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ride sharing and public transportation, and targeted tax incentives for commercially viable clean-energy sources such as solar water heating and wind generation.
Other tax incentives worth considering include investment and production tax
credits for generating electricity from clean and renewable sources such as biomass
and CH 4 from landfills, and tax credits for preserving and enhancing carbon sinks.
However, in these and other areas—for example, the energy efficiency of residential
and commercial/industrial buildings—regulatory requirements and direct subsidies
are likely to be more effective and less complicated than tax expenditures.
Although this article proposes several taxes and tax incentives, it does not address
the detailed design of these tax measures, or the level of government by which they
should be implemented. However, by encouraging greater attention to the role
that tax policy can play in reducing global warming and by identifying the most
promising tax measures for this purpose, it should serve a useful purpose.

